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Abstract
This paper pushes back against the Democritean-Newtonian tradition of
assuming a strict conceptual dichotomy between spacetime and matter. Our
approach proceeds via the more narrow distinction between modified grav-
ity/spacetime (MG) and dark matter (DM). A prequel paper argued that the
novel field Φ postulated by Berezhiani and Khoury’s ‘superfluid dark matter
theory’ is as much (dark) matter as anything could possibly be, but also—
below the critical temperature for superfluidity—as much (of a modification
of) spacetime as anything could possibly be. Here we introduce and crit-
ically evaluate three groups of interpretations that one should consider for
such Janus-faced theories. The consubstantiality interpretation holds that Φ
is both (dark) matter and a modification of spacetime, analogously to the
sense in which Jesus (according to catholicism) is both human and god. The
fundamendalist interpretations consider for each of these roles whether they
are instantiated fundamentally or emergently. The breakdown interpretations
focus on the question of whether Φ signals the breakdown, in some sense to be
specified, of the MG-DM dichotomy and perhaps even the broader spacetime–
matter distinction. More generally, it is argued that hybrid theories urge a
move towards a single space of theories, rather than two separate spaces of
spacetime theories and matter theories, respectively.
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1 Introduction
Democritus claimed that everything in our universe is ultimately reducible
to atoms (matter) or void (space). This strict conceptual and metaphysical
dichotomy between matter and space(time)—everything in our universe fits
into exactly one of those categories—has reigned supreme ever since Newton
revived it. Recently, several approaches to the problem of quantum gravity
have put pressure on these two categories and the strict dichotomy between
them. There is however reason to worry long before reaching the region where
quantum gravity becomes relevant. (Moreover, focusing on these cases has the
additional benefit of staying closer to experiment/observation.) How to cate-
gorise the metric in plain old general relativity (GR) is already controversial,
as it exhibits both properties that are standardly associated with spacetime
as well as properties that are standardly associated with matter [1–19] [20,
p.354] [21, Ch.9] [22, §3.3] [23, §8] [24, p.36]. We contend that the pressure
becomes even more acute when considering certain theories featuring in the
debate between dark matter (DM) and modified gravity/spacetime (MG).
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In particular, the prequel [19] to this second of two companion papers
argued that the novel field Φ postulated by Berezhiani and Khoury’s ‘superfluid
dark matter theory’ (SFDM) [25, 26] is as much (dark) matter as anything
could possibly be, but also—below the critical temperature for superfluidity—
as much (of a modification of) spacetime as anything could possibly be. This
first result leaves open certain interpretational questions. For instance, does the
fact that Φ instantiates the spacetime role only below the critical temperature
for superfluidity imply that it is ‘really’ dark matter, acting (in the sub-critical-
temperature regime) ‘as if’ it were a modification of gravity and spacetime?
Or is the sense in which Φ is dark matter on a par with the sense in which it is
a modification of gravity and spacetime? Does the result of the prequel paper
put pressure on the contemporary importance, usefulness or even coherence of
the dark matter/ modified gravity dichotomy and perhaps even on the broader
matter–spacetime distinction?
It is the aim of this paper to unpack these and other interpretational ques-
tions. After introducing ‘superfluid dark matter theory’ in more detail in sec-
tion 2 and reiterating the conclusion of the prequel paper in section 3, we will
introduce and critically evaluate nine potential interpretations—distributed
across three groups—that we believe one should consider when attempting to
understand theories with objects that do not all fall neatly into one of the two
categories (i.e. spacetime and matter). The goal is not so much to advocate a
single interpretation that is definitely to be preferred—we argue that four out
of nine interpretations are currently viable for SFDM—but to put on the table
a chart of viable ways of understanding theories like SFDM and advantages of
and problems with each approach. This is partially because the theory is very
new (and, in particular, known to be incomplete, as will be discussed below),
and partially because the difference between some interpretations might be
best fought out at the level of the space of theories rather than within a single
theory. This case study of SFDM serves as a bottom-up approach to the car-
tography of this space of theories,1 by inspiring a chart of interpretations that
may help us understand and navigate that large space. Section 4 introduces the
consubstantiality interpretation, which holds that Φ is both (dark) matter and
a modification of spacetime, analogously to the sense in which Jesus (accord-
ing to catholic doctrine) is both human and god. The (four) fundamendalist
interpretations (section 5) consider for each of these roles whether they are in-
stantiated fundamentally or emergently. The (four) breakdown interpretations
(section 6) focus on the question of whether Φ signals the breakdown, in some
sense to be specified, of the MG-DM dichotomy and perhaps even the broader
spacetime–matter distinction. Section 7 discusses the relations between these
interpretations, and reflects upon the lessons learned regarding the DM/MG
distinction, the broader spacetime–matter distinction, and the cartography of
the space of theories.
1Note that this cartographic project differs from the related cartographic project by Slowik,
who aims to provide a map of substantivalist and relationalist positions [27].
3
2 ‘Superfluid Dark Matter theory’ (SFDM)
In order to make this paper somewhat self-contained and in order to be able
to refer back to the relevant Lagrangians, we almost verbatim reproduce the
introduction to ‘superfluid dark matter theory’ from the previous paper [19],
followed by comments regarding its completeness. Readers familiar with the
prequel paper may wish to skip ahead to the final paragraph of this section.
Theories labeled as dark matter theories have traditionally done well at
the level of cosmology and galaxy clusters, but less so at the level of galaxies.
The opposite is the case for theories labeled as modifications of gravity and/or
spacetime. A promising approach to breaking this stalemate is to find a single
novel entity for which there is a natural, physical, dynamical reason why it
behaves like DM on large scales and like MG on galactic scales. In this respect
it is relevant to note that to mediate a long-range force in galaxies, a mass-
less messenger (force carrier) is needed. A natural candidate presents itself:
the quantised soundwaves of a superfluid, i.e. phonons, which are Goldstone
bosons and thus massless. In the Standard Model of Particle Physics, matter
(in the broad sense used in this paper) is divided into bosonic force carriers
and fermionic matter (in a narrower sense of matter).2 But there is no rea-
son why matter, in this narrow sense, could not also be bosonic, and it is not
uncommon for new dark matter theories to postulate a bosonic dark matter
field. If the associated particles self-interact (repulsively), they can form a
superfluid Bose-Einstein condensate (BEC), which carries phonons. In other
words, in this phase one cannot associate with the field a set of individual
(nearly) collisionless particles; it is best described in terms of collective exci-
tations. If these phonons cohere they can mediate a long-range force. If the
phonons are described by the appropriate Lagrangian, they mediate a MOND-
ian force. In order for the superfluid BEC phase to obtain, the De-Broglie
wavelength of the Φ-particles needs to be larger than the mean interparticle
separation [25, p.5] [28, §2.2] (or equivalently, the associated temperature needs
to be below a critical value). In order for the phonons to cohere the BEC needs
to be allowed sufficient time to thermalise [25, p.5-6]. If parameters are cho-
sen such that those two conditions obtain only in galaxies, but not at larger
scales, this would provide a natural reason for why the MONDian behaviour
of the single novel entity appears only in galaxies. This approach to resolving
the dark phenomenon stalemate is created and developed by Berezhiani and
Khoury, under the name ‘Superfluid Dark Matter Theory’. We will outline the
original version of their theory [25, 26] in this section.
This theory postulates a self-interacting, massive, complex scalar field Φ
with global U(1) symmetry, via the following term:
LΦ = −
1
2
(
|∂µΦ|
2 +m2|Φ|2
)
−
Λ4
6(Λ2c + |Φ|
2)6
(
|∂µΦ|
2 +m2|Φ|2
)3
(1)
with Λc and Λ two constants introducing two mass/energy scales.
3 (The main
2We are excluding the Higgs boson here, since, although it is a boson, it is not associated with
one of the four fundamental forces.
3Λc ensures that the theory admits a Φ = 0 vacuum [25, p.15].
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justification for this choice of Lagrangian comes from reverse engineering: it is
this Lagrangian that will ultimately reproduce MOND in the Galactic regime,
as discussed below.)
Spontaneous symmetry breaking of the global U(1) symmetry yields, in the
non-relativistic regime, the following Lagrangian for the associated Goldstone
bosons—these massless phonons being represented by the scalar field θ, the
phase of Φ = ρei(θ+mt):
LT=0,¬rel,θ =
2Λ(2m)3/2
3
X
√
|X |, (2)
with
X ≡ θ˙ −mΦ−
(~∇θ)2
2m
, (3)
where Φ is now interpreted as the external gravitational potential. (This iden-
tification receives its justification when one derives this non-relativistic descrip-
tion from the relativistic description, i.e. Eq.(4), with g˜ = g˜SFDM as given by
Eq.(6).) To lowest order in the derivatives, superfluid phonons are in general
described by a scalar field θ governed by a Lagrangian L = P (X), with X given
by Eq.(3) [25, p.3] [29]. The specific choice of P given by Eq.(2) uniquely de-
termines the specific type of superfluid, namely one that interacts primarily
through three-body interactions, i.e. with an equation of state P ∝ ρ3.
The interaction between the phonons and the regular (i.e. luminous) mat-
ter fields is then added to this Lagrangian as an “empirical term” [25, p.8]
(as opposed to being derived from an interaction term in the fundamental La-
grangian). In the relativistic regime we may describe this via the metric g˜µν ,
sometimes referred to as the physical metric—why such metrics deserve this
name is discussed in [19, §5.2]—because all luminous-matter fields couple uni-
versally to this metric (and to the Einstein metric gµν only indirectly, via this
physical metric):4
L rel, int = L(g˜µν , ψ
α, ψα;µ|g˜) (4)
with ψα the luminous-matter fields, and ψα;µ|g˜ denoting the covariant derivative
with respect to g˜. The physical metric of SFDM is inspired by that of TeVeS.
TeVeS, a theory usually referred to as a modification of gravity, postulates
two new dynamical fields—a real scalar field φ and a 4-vector field Aµ—which,
together with the Einstein metric gµν , constitute the effective metric g˜
TV S
µν .
This physical metric is disformally related to the Einstein metric [31] [32,
§3.4]. That is, it does not stretch the Einstein metric equally in all directions,
which would leave all angles and thus shapes invariant, as with a conformal
transformation, but instead stretches it by a factor of e−2φ in the directions
orthogonal to Aµ ≡ gµνAν while shrinking it by the same factor in the direction
parallel toAµ, where the Sanders 4-vector field Aµ is unit-time-like with respect
4 In a later paper [30], photons are not coupled to the effective metric, but to the Einstein
metric. Some conclusions reached in section 5.2 of the prequel paper [19] do not apply to that
alternative version of the SFDM theory.
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to the Einstein metric (gµνAµAν = −1) [31–33]:
g˜TV Sµν = e
− 2αΛ
MPl
φ
(gµν +AµAν)− e
2αΛ
MPl
φ
AµAν
= e
− 2αΛ
MPl
φ
gµν − 2AµAνsinh(
2αΛ
MPl
φ)
≈ gµν −
2αΛ
MPl
φ(gµν + 2AµAν),
(5)
with MPl the Planck mass and α a dimensionless coupling constant.
SFDM modifies TeVeS in two ways: one semantic and one syntactic mod-
ification. The semantic revision is to not add yet another (vector) field, but
to identify the four-vector Aµ with the unit four-velocity uµ of the previously
added scalar field Φ.5 Syntactically, the TeVeS factor of 2 is generalised to
obtain:
g˜SFDMµν ≈ gµν −
2αΛ
MPl
θ (γgµν + (1 + γ)uµuν) , (6)
with TeVeS being recovered for γ = 1 (and a metric conformally related to gµν
for γ = −1).
The full relativistic form may be used to calculate gravitational lensing
effects. In the context of recovering the galaxy rotation curve component of
the dark phenomena we only require the non-relativistic approximation:
L¬rel,int = −α
Λ
MPl
θρb, (7)
where ρb is the baryon density. The total effective, non-relativistic Lagrangian
can then be shown to reproduce [25, p.10-11], under suitable approxima-
tions (such as θ being static and spherically symmetric), the MONDian result
aMOND =
√
a0
GMb(r)
r2 for a baryonic particle with mass Mb, after identifica-
tion of a0 =
α3Λ2
MPl
.
To a particle physicist, the fractional power of X (Eq.2), 3/2, although
required if one aims to eventually regain MONDian behaviour [25, §IV], might
seem strange—it is, for instance, less straightforward to draw corresponding
Feynman diagrams. In condensed matter theory, such powers are far from
rare. As mentioned, this specific fractional power corresponds to a phonon
superfluid, with equation of state P ∝ ρ3.
Superfluidity only occurs at sufficiently low temperature. This naturally
distinguishes between galaxies and galaxy clusters. Due to the smaller veloci-
ties in galaxies,6 the superfluid description is appropriate there,7 exactly where
MOND is successful. In the clusters the velocity/ temperature is too high, and
one finds either a mixture of the superfluid and normal phase, or only the
normal phase, suggesting that the theory might exemplify the usual successes
of dark matter theories at that level.
5Of the normal fluid component; see below.
6Given a mass m and density ρ [25, Eqs. 8 & 80].
7Since the local phonon gradient induced by the Sun is too large to satisfy the criteria for a
superfluid Bose-Einstein condensate, the condensate loses its coherence, which allows SFDM to
avoid solar system constraints [25, §V].
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Unfortunately it is non-trivial to piece together a complete, general (i.e. valid
at all temperatures) theory from the separate pieces provided above. Assuming
that we would be able to find a relativistic generalisation of the free phonon
Lagrangian (Eq.2), we take it that Berezhiani and Khoury intend the following
(relativistic) Lagrangian to correspond to a complete description of the super-
fluid regime, that is below Tc—or strictly speaking only at T = 0, since at
finite temperatures correction terms would need to be added [25]:
LT=0 = LEinstein−Hilbert(gµν)+Lθ(θ, gµν)+Lluminous(g˜
SFDM
µν , ψ
α, ψα;µ|g˜SFDM ).
(8)
It is then tempting to postulate as the general Lagrangian:
Lgen = LEinstein−Hilbert(gµν)+LΦ(Φ, gµν)+Lluminous(g˜
SFDM
µν , ψ
α, ψα;µ|g˜SFDM ).
(9)
In order for this to reproduce the successes of dark matter theories in galaxy
clusters and at the cosmological level, we would like the theory to take on or ap-
proximateLEinstein−Hilbert(gµν)+LDM (DM-field, gµν)+Lluminous(gµν , ψ
α, ψα;µ|gµν )
in that regime (i.e. above Tc). For that to be the case, g˜
SFDM needs to re-
duce to the Einstein metric in that regime. Prima facie, this seems to work
out nicely: g˜SFDM is given by the Einstein metric plus a phonon modification
term which vanishes when θ is zero. Above the critical temperature there are
indeed no phonons. However, although θ may indeed represent the phonon
field below Tc, it is, in general, the phase of Φ. As such there is no reason why
it would, generally speaking, be zero or even very small at large temperatures.
It is thus an open question what the full SFDM theory is.
3 The field Φ matters and spacetimes
In the companion paper, we introduced a family of criteria for something to be
matter [19]. The strongest such criterion was ‘having mass’.8 It also introduced
a set of jointly sufficient criteria for allowing something to be interpreted as
spacetime structure: a) being an object that is faithfully representable by a
differentiable manifold with an affine connection and a Lorentzian conformal
structure (i.e. an equivalence class of Lorentzian metrics) such that b) there is a
well-defined initial value problem, and such that c) if test particles and/or light
rays were around they would, for any choice of initial conditions, follow the
timelike and null geodesics, respectively, of the same family of geodesics (i.e. the
(strong) geodesic criterion), and such that d) special relativity is locally valid,
in the sense that no non-negligible curvature terms appear in the equations of
motion (i.e. the chronogeometricity criterion).
We argued that, according to these criteria, it is clear that the scalar field
Φ occuring in SFDM is as much ‘matter’ as it could possibly be: it fulfils the
8More precisely: The object under consideration changes in a regular fashion. This change is
(partially) in response to something external, and the interaction describable in terms of coupled
differential equations, in such a way that the object can be said to carry exchangable energy (and
momentum) representable by a stress-energy tensor, Tµν , part of which is due to the rest mass of
the object. In other words: the object is massive.
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strongest matter citerion of having rest mass, and all the prior criteria that
the mass criterion builds on. Denying that Φ is (dark) matter would imply
that even paradigmatic instances of matter such as electrons (as they appear
in the Standard Model of particle physics) are not matter either.
However, the Φ-field arguably scores just as well in terms of being (an
aspect of) spacetime as it does in terms of being matter. We argued that,
in the superfluid regime, g˜µν satisfies the above criteria for something to be
interpreted as (an aspect of) spacetime. Given that g˜µν is defined in terms of
Φ, one could argue that Φ is thus just as much (an aspect of) spacetime as it is
matter. The rest of the paper is devoted to introducing and evaluating three
groups of viable interpretations of Φ as it features within SFDM, in light of the
above, with the aim of providing an interpretational chart that can serve as
a tool for describing and ultimately understanding (theories with) fields that
are both (dark) matter and (aspects of) spacetime.
4 Interpretations by analogy with theology
As we have seen in the previous section, the Φ-field in SFDM scores just as
high in terms of being matter as it scores in terms of being (an aspect of)
spacetime. In the following sections we will see interpretations that claim that
it is fundamentally one and merely emergently the other, or even that what
we see is a breakdown of the very distinction between spacetime and matter.
Both of these (families of) interpretations are rather radical if one is used to
the classical distinction between spacetime and matter. And a conservatively
minded philosopher/physicist might well ask: are we not overreacting to the
existence of Φ with either option?
By analogy, let us consider corresponding scenarios from theology where we
may ask what a new type of entity meant for the distinction between human
and god, which arguably was challenged just as much—or just as little—by
this new entity as the distinction between spacetime and matter is challenged
by Φ.
Consider first mythologies with demigods, like Heracles in Greek mythology.
A demigod has two parents, one a god and one a human, and a demigod was
thus 50% human and 50% god. Zeus (Heracles’ father) was 100% god, and
Alcmene (Heracles’ mother) was 100% human. Contrast this with the Christian
Jesus, understood according to the consubstantiality thesis or Trinitarianism:9
Jesus is not a demi-god, nor indeed either purely human or purely god; he is
supposed to be 100% god and 100% human, even while on Earth. Puzzling
about how this could be is one of the great mysteries of catholic scholarship.
But despite all this, it would not be sensible to say that this concept of Jesus
brought about the breakdown of the very distinction between god and human.
Jesus is, in a conceptual sense, an anomaly, the single being that is seen as
both fully human and fully god. However, this does not mean that any human
(even a faithful catholic) should have any problem with classifying themselves
and their neighbours as clearly human and non-god.
9See, for instance, Catechism 467.
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How is this analogous to the physical fields that we are attempting to
interpret? Recall first, from the prequel paper [19], that non-trivial metric
solutions gµν in GR satisfy up to matter criterion D (action-reaction) or E
(energy definable in region). This suggests that gµν is not 0% matter, but,
if one requires a stronger matter criterion as a sufficient criterion for being
matter, then gµν is not 100% matter either. Combining this with the claim
that gµν is 100% spacetime (modulo the caveats mentioned in the prequel
paper) suggests that the analogue of non-trivial metrics in GR lies somewhere
between Heracles and Jesus. When it comes to Φ, being fully (dark) matter
and (an aspect of) spacetime, there is no mistaking its analogue: Jesus.10
Hence, we call the interpretation of Φ discussed in this section, by analogy,
the consubstantiality interpretation. A similar interpretation for objects that
are only partially matter and partially spacetime would be called the demi
interpretation, by analogy with demigods such as Heracles.
Advocates of the two other, revisionary groups of interpretations discussed
in the following sections may or may not grant that the existence of ‘demigod
objects’ (such as Heracles and gµν) leaves the associated distinctions (god–
human or matter–spacetime) untouched, but they insist that ‘full hybrid ob-
jects’ (such as Jesus or Φ) are either problematic for the associated distinctions
or at least require us to say something more. This is one of the ways in which
considering the issue of distinguishing matter and spacetime in the SFDM
context goes beyond considering it within GR. On the consubstantiality inter-
pretation however, the existence of a field like Φ that is just as much matter,
namely maximally, as it is an aspect of spacetime structure, does not cause
any big problems for the spacetime/matter distinction. The senses in which Φ
is matter and spacetime are on a par. Nothing further needs to be said. Sure,
Φ is rather unusal and weird in this way, but as long as it is in a clear minority
with respect to other entities, the spacetime/matter distinction stands strong:
it remains coherent, applicable, objective and useful. In a strange way, one
might even say that the analysis of Φ has shown us what it really means to be
matter, just as the concept of Jesus, some would say, has shown us what it is
to be human.
The consubstantiality interpretation is a viable interpretation of Φ. To the
10Other similar analogues that one might wish to consider are the two-faced gods Janus from
Roman mythology and Culsans from Etruscan mythology, although the possibility of having a
second face is not as conceptually surprising and controversial as one might think it is to be
both spacetime and matter or a human and a god. Perhaps the double personality of Voldemort-
Quirrell is a somewhat better analogy in this regard. If one were to consider a field which plays
only the spacetime role when it is in one phase and only the matter role when it is another phase—
as Berezhiani and Khoury consider to be the case for Φ (Section 5)—then the transformations
between Bruce Banner and the Hulk, and between Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde may be good analogies.
If instead—as we believe to be the case for Φ (Section 5)—a field is always and everywhere matter
but only in one specific phase also spacetime, the comparison with Jennifer Walters and She-Hulk
seems more appropriate, as the personality of Walters is still (mostly) there even when in She-
Hulk form. Finally, Hossenfelder [34] uses ‘imposter’ terminology, which may suggest a Clark
Kent/Superman analogy. However, this would not suggest an interpretation equivalent to the
consubstantiality interpretation, but something more in the spirit of the elitist interpretations
(Section 5) (but see fn.12).
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MG
fundamental emergent
DM
fundamental (MG+DM)-fundamentalism DM-fundamentalism
(or: dualism)
emergent MG-fundamentalism non-fundamentalism
(or: neutral monism)
Table 1: Matrix of views that for each of the DM and MG aspects distinguish
between them being fundamental or merely emergent aspects. Egalitarian views
are in italics; elitist views are underlined.
extent that there might be an objection to this interpretation it would be that
one or both of the other two groups of options on the table, discussed below,
provide a better or more complete account. Both groups of alternatives insist
that there is more to be said about Φ being 100% matter and 100% spacetime.
Hence, we will compare and contrast the consubstantiality interpretation with
these other interpretations in Section 7, after the latter have been introduced
and analysed.
5 Fundamentalist interpretations
The fundamentalist interpretations go beyond the consubstantiality interpre-
tation by claiming, for each of the DM and MG aspects, whether Φ exhibits
them fundamentally or not. This results in a 2 by 2 matrix of logically possible
views, see Table 1. On the (MG+DM)-fundamentalist interpretation, both as-
pects are fundamental aspects of Φ. On the non-fundamentalist interpretation
Φ is fundamentally neutral, i.e. neither DM nor MG; both of these aspects are
non-fundamental, derivative, or even emergent. Besides these two egalitarian
positions11 there are two elitist positions, on which only one of the DM and MG
categories is a fundamental aspect or property of Φ, with the other category
being merely a derivative or emergent aspect or property—as opposed to the
divinity and humanity of Jesus being, in all relevant senses, on a par. There-
fore the egalitarian positions can be considered as being closer to (the spirit
of) the consubstantiality interpretation. Similarly, the non-fundamentalist in-
terpretation is closest (in spirit) to the breakdown interpretations (see below),
as both aspects being metaphysically non-fundamental opens the door to them
not being conceptually fundamental either. (The relations between these in-
terpretations will be discussed further in Section 7.)
Within the category of elitist interpretations, it may seem most plausi-
ble that Φ is fundamentally dark matter and emergently a modification of
gravity and spacetime (DM-fundamentalism), rather than vice versa (MG-
fundamentalism). The MG-nature is important only in galaxies. Hence, Φ
11Not to be mistaken with the notion of ‘egalitarian interpretation’ in [11].
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merely plays the role of a modification of spacetime in that regime; it is an
MG-impersonator,12 not fundamentally a modification of spacetime.
Arguably, this is what the creators of SFDM have in mind. The following
textual evidence places them in the right column of Table 1.
In contrast with theories that propose to fundamentally modify
Newtonian gravity, in this case the new long-range force mediated
by phonons is an emergent property of the DM superfluid medium.
(italics in the original) [30, p.3]
Unlike most attempts to modify gravity, there is no fundamen-
tal additional long-range force in the model. Instead the phonon-
mediated force is an emergent phenomenon which requires the co-
herence of the underlying superfluid substrate. (italics in the origi-
nal) [30, p.16]
The name given by them (but not by Hossenfelder, who calls it a modified
gravity theory! [34]) to their theory, i.e. superfluid dark matter, further narrows
it down to DM-fundamentalism. In the remainder of this subsection we will
focus on evaluating this interpretation—it being further removed from the
consubstantiality interpretation than the egalitarian interpretations and prima
facie more plausible than MG-fundamentalism. Comments regarding the other
three interpretations will be made along the way.
Before proceeding it is important to note that Berezhiani and Khoury seem
to operate under a different understanding of the dark matter aspect of Φ.
Whereas we take the property of ‘having mass’ (or one of the weaker mat-
ter criteria [19]) to be what makes Φ dark matter, they seem at places to
identify the DM nature of Φ with its particle nature, that is the phase in
which Φ is appropriately described as individual collisionless particles, i.e. the
phase above Tc (as opposed to the MG-phase below Tc where a description in
terms of collective excitations—phonons—is considered more appropriate). In
their words: “DM and MOND components have a common origin, represent-
ing different phases of a single underlying substance” [25, p.3]. It turns out,
ironically, that not only does their understanding of the DM nature of Φ un-
dermine the main argument in favour of DM-fundamentalism more obviously
than our criterion does (§5.1), it also comes with its own strong argument
against DM-fundamentalism (§5.2). After a brief discussion of these two argu-
ments follows a more lengthy discussion of a general group of problems that
DM-fundamentalism faces on either understanding of the DM nature of Φ.
5.1 The scope argument
As briefly hinted at before, one line of argument in favour of DM-fundamentalism
is the following. Φ exhibits its DM nature everywhere in the universe; this is
not the case for its MG nature (which appears predominantly in galaxies).
Hence, the DM nature of Φ is more fundamental than the MG nature. Let us
12Hossenfelder [34] uses ‘imposter’ terminology, but we do not want to suggest that what is
impersonated/mimicked is fictive; it is real; it is just not fundamental. Compare this to a chair,
which despite not being fundamental is still real rather than a fiction.
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call this the scope argument.13 It is not immediately obvious why this conclu-
sion would follow. There are at least three ways of fleshing out this argument.
Two flawed ways will be discussed here. A better version is touched upon in
§5.3.
Before evaluating the validity of this argument, it is important to note that
it is not even sound to begin with if one understands, with Berezhiani and
Khoury, the DM and MG natures of Φ as each being a distinct phase of Φ.
It is of course not impossible for several phases of a substance to coexist—at
the triple point of water there are even three phases that co-exist—but we
would typically expect a single phase to be dominant. At some regions and
times this will be the DM phase, at others the MG phase. The premises of
the above argument do not hold. They do seem to hold14 on our preferred
understanding of the DM-nature of Φ, i.e. its massiveness: Φ is always and
everywhere massive, but does not always and everywhere form a superfluid
BEC. (It should of course be noted though that there is not yet a complete
theory, exactly because there is no justification for the θ-modification to the
Einstein metric vanishing outside of galaxies.)
A first way of cashing out the scope argument starts from the claim that
because of the universal scope of the DM aspect of Φ and the non-universal
scope of the MG aspect, the former is more important than the latter. Hence, Φ
is DM in a ‘more real’, a ‘more fundamental’ sense than that it is MG. However,
not only is ‘importance’ a vague, subjective, anthropocentric term, but this
version of the argument conflates the colloquial meaning of fundamental—
important—with the more philosophical, technical meaning that is intended in
the formulation of DM-fundamentalism (see Subsection 5.3).
A second way of cashing out the argument phrases the non-universality
of the MG-aspect of Φ as that aspect ‘appearing’ in galaxies and ‘disappear-
ing’ outside of galaxies. On an understanding of ‘to emerge’ as this notion
of ‘to appear’, DM-fundamentalism follows. But this similarly mistakes the
relevant technical notion of emergence with the colloquial meaning. That a
property does not appear always and everywhere does not imply that it is
non-fundamental. Consider electromagnetism. The magnetic field inside an
infinitely long solenoid will be non-zero, but outside the solenoid it will be zero.
We do not usually take this to imply that the magnetic field is non-fundamental
(within electromagnetism). Similarly, in electrostatics a Faraday cage may be
used to shield off an external electric field. That the electric field disappears
within the cage is not usually taken to imply that it is non-fundamental. This
second version of the argument seems to mistake essentialism—for a property
to be essential to an object it must be instantiated always and everywhere in
all possible worlds inhabitated by that object—for fundamentalism.
What perhaps inspires these two versions of the argument is that paradig-
matic emergent theories, such as Newtonian gravity as compared to General
relativity, are not universally valid but only (approximately) valid in certain
13Thanks to Katie Robertson and Alex Franklin for pushing us on this line of argument.
14However, if the final theory of SFDM is indeed such that the modification of the Einstein
metric at T ≫ Tc goes to zero—see the end of Section 2—then it seems to be the case that the
MG aspect is instantiated everywhere after all, albeit (partially) trivially.
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limiting regimes (see the ‘formal asymmetry criterion’ in Subsection 5.3). It is
indeed the case that emergent theories that are the limit of a more fundamental
theory therefore have a limited scope of applicability. But it does not follow
that the implication goes in the other direction: from a non-universal scope of
some property it does not follow that that property can only be described by
an emergent theory that is the limit of a more fundamental theory.
On colloquial understandings of the notions ‘fundamental’ and ‘emergent’
the scope argument is not valid. For it to stand any chance it must con-
nect the non-universality of the MG nature of Φ to the technical notions of
‘fundamental’ and ‘emergent’ that are intended in the formulation of DM-
fundamentalism. These technical notions will be outlined in §5.3, where the
scope argument will be touched upon when the notion of ‘ontological depen-
dence’ is discussed.
5.2 Water analogy
Remember that the superfluid BEC, which carries the phonons that mediate
the MONDian force, is a phase of Φ; this effect appears at temperatures below
the superfluid phase transition. If one follows Berezhiani and Khoury in taking
the DM-aspect to be the phase of Φ above the critical temperature (but not
on our understanding of DM), DM-fundamentalism starts to sound a lot like
saying that water vapour is more fundamental than liquid water,15 or liquid
water more fundamental than ice. We do not tend to think of the different
phases of water in that way;16 they are just different but equal states of being
of a single underlying entity. (Moreover, if we would encounter one phase
only or mainly in galaxies, and the other phase all over the universe, this
would not change anything.) This resonates with egalitarian interpretations
of the different phases of water.17 On a strong reading of ‘underlying’ in
15In the phase diagram of water, one can even move between the liquid and vapour phases
without crossing any phase transition, namely by circumventing the critical point. The only
difference between these two ‘phases’ is then their density (which would justify a fundamental–
emergent distinction even less). (Thanks to Stephen Blundell for this point.) The two phases of Φ
are thus perhaps better compared to ice and liquid water.
16At least some phase transitions (such as the transition of Φ at Tc) are associated with a breaking
of the symmetries of the system. From a particle physics perspective, e.g. in the context of grand
unified theories, it may seem common to associate with this change in symmetry a difference in
fundamentality. However, this notion of fundamentality in terms of unification or scope, if indeed a
relevant notion of fundamentality at all, differs from the concepts of fundamentality and emergence
as intended in this paper (§5.3).
17In §5.3 it will be pointed out that in galaxies, generally speaking, a dynamical mixture occurs:
both the DM and the MG aspects simultaneously contribute to the total dynamics of luminous
matter. Does this consistute a (relevant) disanalogy with water? As pointed out before, even
water can co-exist in multiple phases; at the triple point of water there are even three phases that
co-exist. However, generally speaking we would expect there to be a single (dominant) phase,
which would indeed speak against the possibility of there generally being a dynamical mixture of
MG and DM if both of these are understood as distinct phases of Φ. The tension resolves when we
note that the ‘DM’ contribution arises from the mass of Φ, which should not have been labeled as
a ‘DM’ contribution if one defines the DM aspect of Φ as its particle phase. The only oddity that
remains is that Berezhiani et al. do in fact label that contribution as the DM contribution [30, Eq.
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the earlier quote by Berezhiani and Khoury—“DM and MOND components
have a common origin, representing different phases of a single underlying
substance” [25, p.3]—non-fundamentalism would be the favoured egalitarian
interpretation. At the fundamental level there is just a neutral entity, water,
H2O (Φ), which can appear in different forms—ice, liquid, vapour (phonons,
individual collisionless particles)—without any single one of these phases being
essential to water (Φ), or a fundamental aspect of it.
To sum up: if one were to equate DM to the phase in which an parti-
cle description is appropriate—which Berezhiani and Khoury do but we do
not—and MG to the phase in which a phonon description is appropriate, DM-
fundamentalism would be problematic.
5.3 Fundamentality & Emergence
It is about time that we spell out in a bit more detail what one might mean
by ‘fundamental’ and ‘emergent’ in the context of DM-fundamentalism (and
the other three fundamentalist interpretations)—other than the too colloquial
meanings of ‘important’ and ‘appearance’, respectively, as discussed in §5.1.
Consider the variant of the notion of emergence that takes it to be a relation
between descriptions, i.e. between different dynamical stories that could be
told to account for the observations. If the DM-fundamentalist interpretation
is appropriate, we might expect (at least) the following picture:
1. Metaphysical asymmetry: the emergent description (i.e. MG) onto-
logically depends on the fundamental description (i.e. DM) [24];
2. Formal asymmetry: the emergent description is obtained from the
fundamental description via an irreversible mathematical operation [35];
3. Scale separation/asymmetry: the fundamental description is a de-
scription of smaller length scales and higher energies; the emergent de-
scription is a description of larger length scales and lower energies.
4. Dynamical separation/autonomy: the fundamental description is a
description in terms of fundamental concepts (i.e. DM) only, and, ideally,
the emergent description is a description in terms of emergent concepts
(i.e. MG) only.
These criteria may be illustrated by comparing, say, an elephant as de-
scribed by zoology with its description in terms of the underlying, more fun-
damental Standard Model of particle physics. There could be quarks without
there being elephants, but not vice versa. The emergent elephant featuring in
Zoology is a coarse-grained version of the underlying description; from it one
cannot retrieve the full state of the quarks. Zoology is a low-energy/ large dis-
tance limit of the Standard Model of particle physics. Zoologists do not need
to talk about quarks; particle physicists do not need to refer to elephants.
We will discuss each of these components in turn. Although the metaphys-
ical symmetry condition is satisfied in some sense in SFDM, there is strong
reason to doubt that the formal asymmetry and dynamical separation apply.
The scale asymmetry definitely does not apply.
47]; we of course agree with this labeling but it is inconsistent with their definition of DM.
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5.3.1 Metaphysical & formal asymmetry
Is there a metaphysical and/or formal asymmetry between the two descrip-
tions in virtue of which we may call the DM description the fundamental one
and the MG description the emergent one? Start with the formal asymme-
try. The literature is riddled with examples of such irreversible mathematical
operations—idealisations, such as the thermodynamical limit, or abstractions,
such as coarse-graining or summation [35,36]. Is the phonon description within
SFDM arrived at via such an irreversible operation?
Franklin and Knox describe phonons as they appear in a crystal lattice of
atoms [36]. They convincingly argue that moving from the atomic displace-
ment variables to a description in terms of phonon variables provides novel
explanatory power. (Similarly, in SFDM, the phonon description explains the
MONDian behaviour in galaxies.) They suggest that this explanatory nov-
elty constitutes a relevant notion of emergence, differing from the standard
notions associated with mathematically irreversible operations. In fact, the
two descriptions are dual. Complete translations between the descriptions are
possible in either direction. In light of this, they report David Wallace as
pointing out that their notion of emergence fails to satisfy what we have called
the metaphysical asymmetry criterion. They concede that a full defense of
the emergent nature of phonons would require a further asymmetric relation
between the two descriptions.
This opens up an interesting possibility. What if there is no such asym-
metric relation? Would both descriptions then be equally fundamental? Or,
arguably, with the phonon description providing novel explanatory power, that
description seems the more fundamental one. On the alternative definition of
DM as the particle nature of an underlying field, this would suggest, in the
context of SFDM, an inverted fundamentalist interpretation, with the MG as-
pect of Φ being fundamental and the DM aspect being merely emergent: the
MG-fundamentalist interpretation.
Is there then a further, metaphysical asymmetry that blocks the conclu-
sion that phonons are fundamental? One may wish to consider several specific
options. One specific option would be composition: phonons in an atomic
crystal are ‘composed’ of the collective behaviour of many many atoms. An-
other specific option would be a part-whole (i.e. mereological) asymmetry. Our
preferred candidate for the relevant metaphysical asymmetry is more general,
namely ontological dependence, which holds if and only if the phonons cannot
exist without the atomic displacements but the atomic crystal could exist with-
out there being phonons. One possible negative response is that in the SFDM
context there is no underlying atomic crystal that could compose the phonons;
it is much less clear that particle excitations of Φ have the same metaphysical
robustness as atoms. A stronger negative response points out that, since the
two descriptions are dual, it is not only the case that the phonon variables are
linear functions of the atomic displacement variables, but the latter are also
linear combinations of the former [36, esp. p.75]. Duality is a symmetric rela-
tion; phonons are as much composed of or a part of atomic displacements as
vice versa. Now, classically we can indeed conceive of an atomic crystal at rest
(i.e. all atomic displacements are 0 and remain 0), which would seem to imply
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that it is possible for an atomic crystal to exist without any phonons existing
‘in’ it. It might be retorted that there would still be an ideal phonon, namely
one of infinite wavelength and hence zero energy. A stronger response is that,
regardless of phonons being ontologically dependent or not on a classical crys-
tal, it is quantum mechanically not possible for a crystal to exist without there
also being phonons. It is not dynamically possible for quantum mechanical
constituents of a crystal to be at rest; the lowest energy state is not zero and
does consist of a phonon (cf. the zero-point energy of a quantum harmonic
oscillator). Phonons are thus not ontologically dependent on an atomic crys-
tal. That being said, we will see below when discussing ‘dynamical separation’
(and in particular the two-fluid model), that the SFDM case is much more
complex than the atomic crystal that Franklin and Knox concern themselves
with. Hence, a full evaluation of the metaphysical and formal asymmetry cri-
teria is outside of the scope of this paper. However, the above discussion serves
to show that one should by no means assume that a phonon, being a ‘collective
excitation’, by default satisfies the metaphysical asymmetry criterion, let alone
the formal asymmetry criterion.
Phonons are not ontologically dependent on the atomic crystal: although
they indeed cannot exist without the crystal, it is not the case that the crystal
could exist without there being phonons. If a crystal exists, then phonons
will also exist. However, there is one obvious way to get rid of the phonons:
melt the crystal. In that sense, even though a crystal ensures the existence
of phonons, it is still possible for atoms to exist (albeit not in crystal form)
without phonons existing. Phonons do not ontologically depend on an atomic
crystal, but they do seem to ontologically depend on the atoms. Similarly,
even if phonons are indeed not ontologically dependent on the superfluid BEC,
one could ‘melt’ this BEC by increasing the temperature, which makes the
phonons disappear whilst leaving individual collisionless (massive) particles
behind. The possible existence of particle excitations of Φ without there be-
ing phonons (which occurs typically in galaxy clusters and at the cosmological
scale) then seems to suggest that phonons are ontologically dependent on the
particles. This then finally suggests the most viable form of the scope argu-
ment: the universal occurrence of the DM-nature of Φ and the non-universal
occurrence of its MG-nature suggests that the latter is ontologically dependent
on the former, and since ‘ontological dependence’ is (part of) the relevant un-
derstanding of the fundamental-emergent dichotomy, DM-fundamentalism is
favoured.
A first thing to note is that, even though in our universe it might well be the
case that there are spacetime regions with particles but without phonons, it is
still true (for finite m) that in each world dynamically allowed by SFDM, there
will be a finite critical temperature below which Φ will be describable in terms
of phonons such that the spacetime criteria are satisfied. In other words, the
existence of Φ does guarantee that in each dynamically allowed world phonons
could be made to exist as long as you (can) cool down the system sufficiently.
To evaluate this final version of the scope argument, we need to again
distinguish between our definition of DM as ‘massiveness’ (or a weaker mat-
ter criterion [19]) and the alternative definition ‘being describable in terms of
individual particles’. Start with the latter. One way to question the scope ar-
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gument is as follows. Sure, the ‘melting story’ above shows us that the particle
excitations of Φ (DM) could exist without there being phonons (MG). But to
prove ontological dependence of the latter on the former, it also needs to be
the case that phonons could not exist without there being particles or atoms.
In the case of an atomic crystal that is obviously the case. But in the case
of a quantum field and especially a superfluid BEC one might well push back
against the claim that there are, in any meaningful sense, individual particles.
The literature on this is vast and we will not dwell on it here [37–55]. If it
is correct that there are not in any meaningful sense individual particles in a
superfluid BEC, it would be the case that phonons and particles are both onto-
logically independent of each other, and that neither of them exists everywhere
in a SFDM-model that could describe our actual universe.
Consider now the scope argument on our (massiveness) definition of DM.
First we may ask whether the MG-behaviour of Φ is ontologically dependent on
its mass. The phonon-mediated force is clearly not reducible to a gravitational
contribution of Φ to the dynamics of luminous matter: it arises from a direct
coupling of the phonons to the baryons (Eqs. 7 & 4). It should be noted that
the evolution of the phonons depends on m, as is clear from Lθ (Eqs. 2 & 3).
But this is a form of dynamical dependence. We are here interested in whether
the existence of the phonons (and the phonon-mediated force) depends on m,
not their behaviour. The answer is negative, in the following sense. For a
very small m, the De-Broglie wavelength and the critical temperature become
very large. Hence, for a very small m, Φ is practically always and everywhere
a superfluid BEC, with the associated phonons mediating the modification of
gravity.
The MG-aspect of Φ does not ontologically depend on its DM-aspect. Nev-
ertheless, the MG-aspect may still depend on Φ, and it does: Φ can exist
without phonons, as it does, for instance, outside of galaxies in a model that
is supposed to represent our actual world, whereas the phonons cannot exist
without Φ. In that sense, the MG description does ontologically depend on
the Φ description, and since we have chosen m to be finite, this Φ description
is a DM description.
In conclusion: given the above mentioned lack of a complete underlying
theory of SFDM, it is at this stage not possible to determine whether the
phonon description is dual to the missing underlying description; but given
Franklin & Knox’s discussion of phonons in an atomic crystal we should refrain
from simply assuming that the formal asymmetry condition is satisfied by
SFDM. Regarding the metaphysical asymmetry condition: phonons are not
ontologically dependent on the superfluid BEC, nor on the mass of Φ. However,
it is possible for Φ to exist without carrying phonons, but not for phonons to
exist without Φ. For finite m, the phonons are thus ontologically dependent
on the Φ description, which is a DM description (on our criteria for DM).
5.3.2 Scale separation
Next we consider the scale separation criterion. Although galaxies are in this
context (i.e. compared to galaxy clusters and the cosmological scale) indeed
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relatively small,18 they correspond to relatively low energies, as superfluidity
occurs below a critical temperature.19 One might retort: so be it—the con-
cepts ‘fundamentality’ and ‘emergence’ do not necessitate this type of particle-
physics-inspired scale separation; it is the other conditions, such as dynamical
separation, that form the essence of emergence.
5.3.3 Dynamical separation
Consider finally dynamical separation. This feature would be violated if the
observations require a dynamical mixture (or dynamical dualism), i.e. if the
total dynamics depends on non-negligible contributions arising both from the
DM nature and from the MG nature of the basic objects of a theory, without
the MG contribution being reducible to the DM contribution. One logically
possible way in which this might happen is if there are (meta)physical reasons
to distinguish two numerically and qualitatively distinct ‘entities’,20 one dark
matter and the other a modification of gravity. Call this ontological dualism
a metaphysical mixture. If these ‘entities’ are equally fundamental, this would
resonate with the egalitarian positions. One specific way21 in which a meta-
physical mixture might occur is if these two entities are (at least partially)
separated in space(time), like a mixture of water and wine. Call this a spatial
mixture. Given that SFDM introduces only a single field Φ, it seems prima
facie to be the case that if the DM and MG aspects were to form a dynam-
ical mixture, this would have to be so without them forming a metaphysical
let alone a spatial mixture. However, Lagrangian 2 only describes the highly
idealized case of a pure superfluid at zero temperature. In reality, at finite
subcritical temperature, the system is better described phenomenologically by
Landau’s two-fluid model [25, 30]: some sort of mixture of both a superfluid
‘phase’ and a normal ‘phase’. We would do well to investigate the metaphysics
of this model, in order to determine whether it supports a metaphysical or
even a spatial mixture.
Landau [57–59]22 developed his two-fluid model (2FM) of superfluidity in
response to a tension between several experiments with Helium II.23 One such
experiment concerns Helium II flowing through a very narrow capillary with-
out any apparent resistance due to viscosity or friction (as long as the velocity
of the flow stays below some critical value) [66]. However, if the viscosity of
Helium II is measured by the damping of oscillating discs immersed in Helium
18It should be noted that, at a yet smaller scale, namely that of individual stars, no condensation
occurs and thus no MONDian behaviour emerges (which happens to be good news in light of solar
system constraints [25,30]).
19Note that not only are the scales inverted from what is required or expected, it is not even the
case that there is a universal length scale. The second condition for the existence of a coherent
BEC (section 2) requires sufficient time for thermalisation to occur, which will differ per galaxy.
20Entities is meant in a broad sense here.
21A metaphysical mixture need not be a spatial mixture. Examples are Khoury’s two scalar
fields (see the conclusion of the prequel paper [19]) [56] in regions where both fields are non-zero,
or the Minkowski metric field and the electric field of a charged point particle in special relativity.
22Building upon earlier work by Tisza [60–64].
23See e.g. Dingle [65] for other such experiments.
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II at a temperature just below the critical temperature Tc = 2.17K, one ob-
tains a substantive value, albeit one that decreases with temperature below
Tc [67]. Landau’s 2FM deals with this “viscosity paradox” [68, p.34] [69, p.13]
by considering Helium II as a ‘mixture’ (in some sense to be determined) of
two parts/components/phases/liquids: a superfluid component, which has no
viscosity and carries no entropy and heat; and a normal component, which is
viscous and carries entropy and heat. There is negligible interaction between
the components. The normal component is responsible for the damping of
the discs, which allows one to assign an ‘effective inertial mass density’ to it.
An effective mass density for the superfluid component can then be defined
by substracting the normal effective mass density from the total mass density
of Helium II.24 The ratio of the densities of each component is a function of
temperature only. At Tc the superfluid component vanishes; at T = 0 the nor-
mal component vanishes. The capillary experiment is explained by the normal
component remaining stationary with respect to the capillary, whilst the su-
perfluid component moves without dissipation—this is called ‘superflow’. The
decrease with temperature of the damping of the oscillating discs is explained
by the density of the normal component decreasing with temperature.
What type of mixture do the two components form? Rice [70,71] has argued
that, for empirical reasons, these components form a spatial mixture: below
Tc the superfluid component has a fibroid structure; just above Tc it starts
to appear in small globules. This suggestion has not gained traction in the
literature. The received view is that the two components are “superimposed”
[65], or “interpenetrating” [72–75], i.e. not separated nor separable in position
space. Rather than a spatial mixture the components are, in some sense to
be specified, two different modes of motion of a single underlying substance.
Landau and Lifshitz therefore use the terms ‘superfluid’ and ‘normal flow ’,
rather than ‘part’ or ‘component’ [59].
Is the 2FM then best interpreted as a mere metaphysical mixture of two
ingredients, i.e. are there two numerically distinct entities even though they
are not spatially separated? One way to answer this is to get a grip on what
is meant by ‘two modes of motion’. Sometimes the received view is (implic-
itly [70]) portrayed as the two ‘components’ being separated not in position
space but in momentum space. One might even be tempted—Berezhiani and
Khoury seem to have fallen for this temptation [25, p.4]—to identify the su-
perfluid component of the Bose-Einstein condensate (i.e. ‘condensate’ in the
broad sense) with the particles in the zero momentum ground state (i.e. the
condensate’ in the narrow sense) and the normal component with the particles
with non-zero momentum (i.e. the “thermal cloud” [73]).
An initial response might be that this would be to commit to a spatial
mixture after all: the superfluid component is comprised of the particles at
rest, with the normal component being comprised of moving particles at other
locations than the particles at rest. This would be the case for a classical
system, but not for a quantum liquid. The indistinguishable ground state
‘particles’ of a free BEC are maximally smeared out; they are everywhere.
24In the subsequently developed microscopic model underlying the phenomenological 2FM one
may derive the effective mass density of the superfluid component independently [69].
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That may still seem to leave open the possibility that the thermal particles are
not everywhere, suggesting that there are regions with ground state particle
mush, but no thermal particles. However, in order for a liquid to form a
(superfluid) BEC in the first place, the thermal De-Broglie wavelength needs
to be at least comparable with the interparticle distance (determined from the
interparticle potential). There is thus no region where the wavefunction of the
thermal particles is negligible. The ground state and the thermal cloud are not
spatially separated.
A stronger response is that it is impossible in the first place to identify
the two ingredients of the 2FM with the ground state and thermal cloud,
respectively. For interacting BECs, at low temperatures including T = 0, only
a small fraction of the particles—roughly 10% for Helium II—is actually in
the ground state, due to the zero point kinetic energy [28, §2.6]. Nevertheless,
at T = 0 all the particles participate in the superflow [28, §2.7], which is
the defining feature of the superfluid component. According to Landau and
Lifshitz, one cannot assign some helium atoms to one component and other
helium atoms to the other component [57–59]—regardless of whether you try
to split the atoms according to their location or their momentum.25
Then, if the 2FM is a metaphysical mixture, it is highly unclear what type
of beasts these two ingredients are. Nevertheless, the viscosity experiments
strongly suggest that there are two distinct ‘things’ with metaphysically dis-
tinct properties. One thing moves through the capillary at rest while the other
stays behind; the latter thing does interact with oscillating disks with the for-
mer thing now staying behind. The normal component carries entropy and
heat; the superfluid component does not. With each component we can asso-
ciate a different effective inertial mass density. We might want to conclude that
there is a metaphysical mixture of two ‘things’ simply in virtue of their distinct
properties, even if we are in the dark as to the carriers of these properties (but
we will see below that there are reasons against this).
Another argument that suggests this same conclusion is the following. In
the literature a distinction is being made between first and second sound;
further empirical support for a metaphysical mixture seems to come from the
observation of this second type of sound in the 2FM. First sound, i.e. phonons,
consists of pressure waves. This means that the total density at each point
varies over time. However, if there is a metaphysical mixture of two components
each with their own effective mass density, these densities can also wave out of
phase, in such a way that the total density stays constant. Since the ratio of
the densities of each component is a function of temperature, this corresponds
to a temperature wave. This second sound has been observed in Helium II.
These two reasons for the existence of a metaphysical mixture can be crit-
icised. Firstly, although such a mixture indeed implies second sound, second
sound does not imply a metaphysical mixture. Second sound can be described
purely in terms of temperature, without needing to split the constant density
25Alonso et al. [75] claim that even if it would be possible to assign each Helium atom to a com-
ponent at a specific time, this assignment would change over time, even in dynamical equilibrium.
This claim is superseded by Landau and Lifshitz’s claim that one cannot assign Helium atoms to
a specific component even at a single instant of time.
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into two components that wave out of phase.
Secondly, how relevant and metaphysically distinct are the differences in
entropy, heat and mass between the two components? One can always and
trivially make the non-naturalistic metaphysical stipulation that instead of
one entity with a value for the entropy S of s ∈ R+, there is one entity with
two partial entropies, namely 0 and s; or even that there are two co-located
entities, one with entropy 0 and the other with entropy s. But that one can
make that trivial stipulation does not mean that we should; Ockham’s razor
even speaks against it. That being said, we do observe something coming out
of the capillary, and it does not carry entropy, even though the superfluid BEC
as a whole does carry entropy.
Let us turn to the effective inertial mass. If this is indeed a physical mass
in the relative sense, a weak equivalence principle—associating with each com-
ponent a gravitational mass numerically identical to its inertial mass—would
ensure that the components have gravitational masses that are (in general) dis-
tinct. Whether the weak equivalence principle holds in this novel context would
of course need to be tested. But it is not obvious that the effective inertial
mass is indeed a physical mass in the first place. That we are able to mathe-
matically define a function of temperature does not mean that this represents
a ratio of physical mass densities out there in the real world. For one thing,
these supposed mass densities are not conserved (but vary with temperature).
Moreover, we know that phonons are in fact massless, in the sense of their dis-
persion relation being gapless. To be fair, we do know that the Helium atoms
have rest masses, which are simultaneously inertial and gravitational masses.
But, since we have seen that we cannot say which Helium atoms are involved in
each component of the 2FM, we cannot simply add their gravitational masses
to obtain the gravitational mass of each component.26 For the same reason the
effective inertial mass of the normal component is not and could not be defined
by summing over the inertial masses of the constituent atoms; instead it arises
from massless phonons (and higher excitations, called rotons) being excited
by the oscillating disks and thereby influencing its inertia. It is not directly
clear why gravity would interact with a quantity so defined. Dingle refers to
this phonon contribution to the effective mass as non-material [65, §4.11].27
Feynman states in 1954 that the effective mass (of the normal component) “is
not the average value of any quantity that can reasonably be ascribed to an
individual excitation. It appears to have meaning only for the entire group of
excitations in, or near, thermal equilibrium” [72, p.271]; and more strongly in
1972: it “is a derived concept and not the density of anything” [76, p.318]. In
summary, it is far from obvious that one can defend a metaphysical mixture
by claiming that there are two distinct components in virtue of them having
distinct entropies (in a non-trivial sense) or them having distinct gravitational
masses (in a strong physical sense).
26However, perhaps it is possible to determine how many particles are (and thus how much mass
is) involved in total per component.
27Dingle takes the effective mass to also include the material mass, i.e. presumably the gravita-
tional mass of the Helium atoms, but this does not seem to follow from the way the effective mass
is calculated.
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Moreover, even if a metaphysical mixture were defensible, it does not seem
to be a mixture of one pure DM component and one pure MG component.
The normal component—as the name suggests—acts like a conventional vis-
cous fluid [28, p.29], i.e. like the phase of Φ (or Helium) above Tc which is
interpreted as DM. The superfluid component exhibits the novel features, such
as superflow, that sparked the interest in superfluids as opposed to normal
fluids. One might thus be forgiven for thinking that the normal component
is the DM component and the superfluid component the MG component of
the mixture. However, the MG behaviour has nothing to do with superflow.
And it is the normal component that carries the phonons. After all, it is in
virtue of these and higher excitations that the normal but not the superfluid
component increases the effective inertia of the oscillating disk, and that the
superfluid but not the normal component flows through the capillary without
dissipation. The phonon-mediated MOND force is thus associated with the
normal component. Can we then interpret the superfluid component (only)
as dark matter? On our criterion for dark matter this is equivalent to asking
whether we can associate gravitational mass with the superfluid component
(only). In the previous paragraph we have seen why one may be skeptical that
the effective inertial mass of a component ensures that it has a gravitational
mass. If this skepticism is unwarranted, both components would (in general)
have a gravitational mass, not just the superfluid component. If the skeptic
is right, we can only associate a gravitational mass with the whole system,
not with each component separately. Either way, it is not the case that the
superfluid component is purely DM-like and the normal component not at all
so.
In summary: we have investigated what kind of ontology is being de-
scribed by Landau’s two-fluid model of superfluidity. A spatial mixture is not
very plausible, nor is it obviously a metaphysical mixture—although the phe-
nomenology still very strongly suggests that there must be such a mixture—and
definitely not of one purely DM-like component and another purely MG-like
component. It is only “formally” [65, p.114] [69, p.15] or “artificial[ly]” [72,
p.272] that a distinction between two components may be made; “it is no more
than a means of expression convenient for describing the phenomena” [58,
p.357] [59, p.515]. If the condition of dynamical separation is to be violated,
it must be because of a mere dynamical mixture.
Is there then a dynamical mixture of dark matter and modified gravity in
galaxies? That is, does the total galactic dynamics depend on simultaneous,
non-negligible contributions arising both from the DM nature and from the
MG nature of Φ, without the MG contribution being reducible to the DM
contribution? Yes, it does. The MONDian features arise from the phonons
coupling directly to the baryons (Eq.7), not from the gravitational mass of Φ.
Φ of course still has a mass, which means that its gravitational contribution
needs to be added28 to the phonon contribution. Berezhiani et al. refer to this
28The relative importance of each contribution depends on the values of the parameters. In
ref. [30, p.3-7,11-12] the DM contribution is more important than in ref. [25, p.13]. In fact,
in the latter paper the DM contribution is considered negligible for radii much smaller than a
certain transition radius. However, this does not change the fact that the remaining phonon
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as the hybrid method of calculating the total dynamics [30, p.4,11-12]. This
dynamical mixture violates the criterion of dynamical separation/autonomy
(i.e. the fundamental description is a description in terms of fundamental con-
cepts (i.e. DM) only, and, ideally, the emergent description is a description in
terms of emergent concepts (i.e. MG) only).
However, a friend of the DM-fundamentalist approach might push back
against this: it would indeed have been pleasant if the emergent description
were in terms of emergent concepts only, but the only thing that is crucial
is that the fundamental description is a description in terms of fundamental
concepts only. Perhaps the hybrid method belongs to the emergent description
only, with the fundamental description being able to provide a non-MG story
underlying the phonon contribution (even though we have seen that that story
would also have to be something other than the gravitational contribution of
the dark matter mass). If we take LΦ (Eq. 1) to be the relevant fundamental
description, there is indeed no MG-aspect to be identified whatsoever, as there
is no direct coupling to luminous matter which might modify the spacetime
that luminous matter would ‘experience’ (i.e. not the Einstein metric). But this
leaves only the option of influencing luminous matter indirectly by contribut-
ing via the mass of Φ to the stress-energy tensor that determines the Einstein
metric, as would be expected from dark matter. And it is for exactly this same
reason that this can hardly be the complete fundamental Lagrangian, since we
do require a direct coupling between phonons (arising from Φ) and luminous
matter at the effective level, Leff,¬rel,int (Eq. 7), to obtain the desired results
for Galaxy rotation curves. It is difficult to see how an emergent Lagrangian
describing the direct interaction between phonons and luminous matter could
arise from a fundamental Lagrangian that contains no non-gravitational inter-
action between Φ and luminous matter whatsoever. Only the non-interacting
effective phonon Lagrangian 2 emerges. The creators of SFDM admit that
Leff,¬rel,int is an “empirical term” [25, p.8] that is added to the phonon de-
scription to obtain the desired results for Galaxy rotation curves. They suggest
that such a coupling may arise if baryonic matter couples to the vortex sector
of the superfluid [25, p.8], or it may be a non-perturbative effect [30, p.5]. Or,
it “could be a soft fundamental coupling between DM and baryons” [30, p.5]
(italics added). In any case, some interaction term needs to be included in
the fundamental Lagrangian; they explicitly acknowledge that “a fundamental
description of [their] DM superfluid is still lacking” [30, p.6]; LΦ is incomplete.
Thus, arguably, the only reason that LΦ (Eq. 1) does not tell an MG-story un-
derlying the phonon contribution to the total dynamics is because it currently
tells no such story at all. Given that a completion would have to ultimately
account for the hybrid method, we may well expect this completion to exhibit
MG features.
To sum up, although the lack of a complete theory of SFDM makes it diffi-
cult to reach a definite conclusion regarding the satisfaction of the dynamical
separation criterion—that is, the fundamental description is a description in
terms of fundamental concepts (i.e. DM) only, and, ideally, the emergent de-
contribution is not reducible to the gravitational mass of Φ. Moreover, near the transition radius
both contributions do become important.
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scription is a description in terms of emergent concepts (i.e. MG) only—we
have good reasons to doubt that this criterion is satisfied.
This then brings us to a summary of our discussion of the fundamentalist
interpretations. For each aspect of Φ, DM and MG, is this aspect fundamen-
tal or emergent? On our understanding of these aspects they are not both
distinct phases of Φ but two different types of beast. The DM aspect is the
massiveness of Φ, the MG aspect is mediated by phonons carried by the normal
component of Φ when Φ is in the condensed phase below the critical superfluid
temperature.
Within the theory as described by Lagrangian 9 the mass is a fundamental
parameter. Since the free Φ terms (LΦ, Eq.1) are not the reason that this
Lagrangian is not the complete Lagrangian, there is good reason to believe
that these terms will survive in the unknown complete theory, which would
preserve the conclusion that the DM aspect of Φ is fundamental.
The MG aspect of Φ is associated with the superfluid BEC phase (i.e. the
multi-component phase below the critical temperature, as opposed to the
single-component phase above that temperature). ‘Phase’ reminds us of ther-
modynamics, a paradigm example of an emergent theory. If we want to con-
sider all interesting aspects of this phase, we may well have to go to the ther-
modynamic limit. But the Thermodynamics of SFDM is a different theory
from the theory described by Lagrangian 8. In our evaluation of Φ according
to the spacetime criteria, no thermodynamics was invoked. Lagrangian 8 suf-
ficed. Within that single Lagrangian, θ and m are on a par, suggesting that
θ is as fundamental as m. This conclusion receives further confirmation from
the scale separation and dynamical separation criteria being problematic when
applied to SFDM. The similar case of phonons in an atomic crystal suggests
that the formal asymmetry criterion may also be violated. The metaphysical
asymmetry criterion is however satisfied in some sense.
Thus, the lower half of Table 1, MG-fundamentalism and non-fundamentalism,
is ruled out, but both of the views in the top half, (MG+DM)-fundamentalism
and DM-fundamentalism, are still contenders for the correct interpretation of
Φ within SFDM. Perhaps a complete theory of SFDM will break the tie, or
perhaps the MG aspect of Φ is simply emergent in some senses but not in
others—we will briefly return to this in Subsection 7.1.
6 Breakdown interpretations
We turn to breakdown interpretations, a weak version of which we sympathise
with in the context of SFDM. The four interpretations in this group have in
common that they take the conceptual distinction between (dark) matter and
(modified) spacetime to break down, albeit for different reasons and in differ-
ent ways. Rynasiewicz has argued that the history from Newtonian physics to
GR, via the concept of the aether and the development to field theory, already
breaks down the distinction between matter and space(time) as it was clas-
sically conceived [6], but he does not distinguish between four different ways
in which a breakdown can happen. We will pry them apart, since only the
weakest version seems to apply to SFDM—and it may be expected that other
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theories satisfy some of the other interpretations but again not all of them.
6.1 Coherence
First consider three strong versions of a breakdown interpretation. On the
strongest of these three versions, the DM–MG distinction and by extension the
matter–spacetime distinction is considered incoherent.29 Rynasiewicz seems to
hint at such an interpretation when he summarises his argument as hoping “to
have established that the substantivalist-relationist controversy is not necessar-
ily well formulated in every theoretical context” [6, p.293], and when he claims
that “[i]nsofar as [the substantivalist-relationist controversy] is intended to have
anything to do with physics, ... it is no longer ... meaningful” [6, p.279, ital-
ics added]. On this incoherentist strong breakdown interpretation, the SFDM
scalar Φ seeming to be both maximally matter-like and maximally spatiotem-
poral is taken to reveal that it is in fact incoherent to distinguish these concepts
in the first place. This follows, for instance, if one takes the well-known con-
tainer metaphor seriously. One might phrase this metaphor as “spacetime is
the container in which matter is contained” or, on a functional understanding:
“to be spacetime is to contain and to be matter is to be contained” [78, p.161-
167] [6, p.306]. It is indeed incoherent to say that Φ, playing both the spacetime
and matter role, is ‘contained in itself’, since containment is an irreflexive re-
lation. The main argument of the prequel paper would become a reductio ad
absurdum.
Another motivation30 for this version of the strong breakdown interpreta-
tion could be the assumption that it is essential to a conceptual spacetime–
matter distinction that it is a strict dichotomy: every object is either (an
aspect of) spacetime or (an aspect of) matter but never both. It seems to be
the case that this is what Rovelli has in mind when he claims, in the context of
GR, that the “very distinction between spacetime and matter is likely to be ill-
founded [7, p.181]”. Rynasiewicz similarly considers whether the breakdown of
the spacetime–matter distinction in the context of the electromagnetic aether
arises from the aether seeming to fall into both categories [6, e.g. p.286,290]. In
any case, if this strict dichotomy were required, Φ would be a straightforward
counterexample.
However, none of the criteria in our two families is necessarily motivated
by the container metaphor nor requires these families to constitute a jointly
exhaustive and mutually exclusive dichotomy. Nothing in the prequel paper
depended on these motivations. That being said, it is important to note
that the two families of criteria are not totally unrelated. Within the fam-
ily of spacetime criteria, the (strong) geodesic and chronogeometricity criteria
(Section 3; [19, §3.2]) refer to matter, namely in the form of test particles, light
rays, rods and clocks. That by itself does not imply any inferential circularity
and hence incoherence of the spacetime–matter distinction: one simply starts
29The consubstantiality thesis/ Trinitarianism (Section 4) has similarly been accused of being
incoherent [77].
30If spacetime and matter are the only two available categories, the container metaphor becomes
a special case of the strict dichotomy assumption.
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by identifying the matter fields, and then uses those as input for the references
to matter in the criteria for spacetime. However, in the prequel paper only
test particles, rods and clocks consisting of luminous matter were considered;
in other words, consisting only of pure matter, i.e. fields that are only matter
and not also spacetime. It may thus seem that in order to evaluate the crite-
ria for being spacetime in the context of SFDM, one already needs to know
beforehand which matter fields are not also spacetime; inferential circularity
looms.
In practice there is however no such inferential problem. In the con-
text of SFDM, one starts by identifying all the matter fields without yet
caring whether they are pure or hybrid matter. These are the field Φ and
the luminous-matter fields ψα. One then inspects the Lagrangian to deter-
mine how these fields couple to the metric fields in the theory. In the su-
perfluid regime, the ψα couple to the physical metric g˜SFDMµν , which is con-
structed from the Einstein metric and Φ (Eq.4). There is no analogous term,
Lmatter(g
SFDM
µν ,Φ,Φ;µ|g˜SFDM ), for Φ qua matter field; the free field Lagrangian
for Φ (see eqs. 1 & 9) refers (implicitly) to the Einstein metric instead. Thus,
g˜SFDMµν satisfies the spacetime criteria with respect to the matter fields ψ
α and
not with respect to the matter field Φ. Moreover, in SFDM no further metric
appears that is constructed from the ψα fields. All this suffices to simulta-
neously make the following two claims: 1) the most spacelike object in the
theory (in the superfluid regime) is g˜SFDMµν (which, remember, is constructed
from Φ), and 2) the ψα are pure matter. This leaves open two options, neither
of which imply an incoherent spacetime–matter distinction. Either (1) is de-
cided to be sufficient to call g˜SFDMµν spacetime, making Φ a hybrid object, and
the ψα the only pure matter fields (with respect to all of which g˜SFDMµν sat-
isfies the spacetime criteria). Or, (1) is considered insufficient to call g˜SFDMµν
spacetime, from which it follows that there is no spacetime at all in the theory;
Φ and ψα are all pure matter fields. Hence, in the latter scenario the space-
time category would not be ill-defined, but just inapplicable to SFDM. This
would make SFDM amenable to the next interpretation to be discussed, not
the incoherence interpretation.
In the prequel paper the first option was chosen. This may seem ad hoc.
Isn’t the point of spacetime that it is ‘experienced’ universally by all matter?
That intuition stems from times when all theorised matter was pure matter.
It is silent on the question of how to extend the concept of the universality of
spacetime to theories with (tentatively) hybrid matter. If there is an option
that ensures (coherence and) applicability and an option that does not, isn’t the
charitable thing to do to go with the former? (That is, assuming application
of the spacetime category is at all useful—this will be questioned below, as
uselessness is much weaker a charge than incoherence or even inapplicability.)
6.2 Applicability
The second-strongest breakdown interpretation grants the coherence of the
(dark) matter and (modified) spacetime categories, but claims that they are
inapplicable to the theory or field under consideration—for reasons beyond the
previous uncharitable claim of the inapplicability of the spacetime category. On
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this interpretation, there is nothing inherently wrong with these concepts, but
it would be a category mistake to apply them to Φ. It is like finding out that
one should not use Aristotelian elements—earth, air, fire, water, aether—but
Newtonian massive point particles, or, different still, quantum fields. Perhaps
this inapplicability of the traditional concepts of matter and spacetime is the
core of Rynasiewicz’s interpretation of the history from Newtonian physics to
GR:
[O]ne could just as well say that [the aether] is neither [space nor
matter], but instead belongs to a category of its own. [6, p.290]
In the course of its development, physical theory simply lost touch
with the categories necessary for the original formulation of the
[substantivalist-relationist controversy, i.e. space(time) and matter].
[6, p.279]
Present-day physicists do not employ a language that conforms with
the original contrast [between matter and space(time)] [6, p.301,
italics in original]31
This raises an obvious question: what, if any, are the correct categories? Ry-
nasiewicz and Earman do raise this question, affirming that there must be
other such categories, but they do so only in the last paragraph of their paper
and book, respectively, leaving it open what exactly the alternative option is
supposed to be:
Some have suggested, as has Earman [see e.g. [79, p.208]], that
what is needed now is a tertium quid to the traditional positions,
something that will require an act of scientific creativity. I submit
that this act, or rather, series of acts, has already occurred, but,
for a multitude of reasons, we have simply failed to recognize it. [6,
p.306]
It is important to point out though that, while the old categories may well be
replaced by new categories, there is no guarantee that nor any urgent reason
why there would be new categories: the inapplicability of the old categories
may simply indicate that they are eliminated rather than replaced.
Does this inapplicability interpretation apply to SFDM? Are the concepts
of matter and spacetime simply the wrong conceptual tools to understand this
theory? If so, what glasses, if any, should we use? What is this tertium quid,
tentatively labeled “dark stuff”? Should we modus tollens the modus ponens of
the prequel paper—‘if the families of criteria for spacetime and matter are ap-
plicable, then Φ satisfies both’? We do not think that the inapplicability thesis
is a viable interpretation of SFDM. For one thing, the category of (‘pure’) mat-
ter still applies—to the luminous matter fields, Lagrangian 4, which are only
matter and not also an aspect of spacetime. Similarly, the category of (‘pure’)
spacetime is still expected to apply in the final SFDM theory to the Einstein
metric in the regime T ≫ Tc where we expect any modifications to be negligible
(see the end of Section 2). Moreover, it is not the case that the proposed new
31See also [12, p.80].
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category, “dark stuff”, is unrelated to the traditional categories. It is fairly
directly related, by being the conjunction of both traditional categories. It is
a hybrid category, rather than a novel, irreducible category. Hence, this case
is not at all analogous to, say, the move from using only Aristotelian elements
to using only strings. The inapplicability breakdown interpretation does not
apply to Φ within SFDM, or at least not beyond the extent one may consider
it to hold already in the case of plain GR. The inapplicability interpretation
would be more appropriate for objects that belong to neither category than
for objects that belong to both categories.
6.3 Objectivity
The final strong breakdown interpretation does grant that there is a coherent
conceptual distinction between (dark) matter and (a modification of) space-
time that applies to the field under consideration, but it is a conventional,
rather than an objective fact, whether that field instantiates one or the other
aspect. This interpretation is of particular interest in light of the claimed dual-
ity between f(R) gravity and particular Brans-Dicke-Theories and the further
claimed equivalence between the Einstein and Jordan frames/representations of
Brans-Dicke Theories [80].32 Rynasiewicz [6] hints that the distinction between
space(time) and matter is conventional in a much larger context—and with-
out even requiring the existence of a duality or equivalent representations—
referring to it as a “verbal [dispute] occasioned by arbitrary preference”33
(p.279), a “fac¸on de parler” (p.287; italics in original), a mere “mode of ex-
pression” (p.290), a matter of “taste” (p.290), “a matter of whim” (p.299),
not a matter of fact (p.301).34 However, it is an objective fact in which phase
the field Φ in SFDM is, and hence an objective fact when it instantiates which
role. The conventionalist strong breakdown approach is not appropriate for Φ
as it features within SFDM, or at least not more so than it may already be in
plain GR.
6.4 Utility
This leads us to a weak version of the breakdown interpretation. The matter
and spacetime categories may coherently and objectively be applied to objects
in physical theories, such as SFDM. Up to this point this interpretation agrees
with the fundamentalist interpretations and the consubstantiality interpreta-
tion. The difference is that whilst on those interpretations this distinction is
considered to be useful (and hence must be retained), on the weak breakdown
32Similar questions of conventionalism seem to arise in string theory in the context of the claimed
equivalence between the string frame and the Einstein frame [81] (which are related by a conformal
transformation involving the dilaton). We would like to thank James Read for suggesting this
interesting comparison.
33This is how North interprets Rynasiewicz [82].
34Vassallo refers to the distinction as “a mere choice of vocabulary”, since it is “naive and
perfectible” [20, p.354], and Rovelli states that it is merely a matter of “semantics”, “only a matter
of choice of words, and thus, ultimately, personal taste” [12, p.77], but it is not clear whether they
mean that it is conventional, or that it is dispensable (see the weak breakdown approach).
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interpretation it is considered to be dispensable. Indeed, there does not seem
to be a clear benefit provided by these categories, at least within SFDM. They
are no longer useful, or, as Rynasiewicz puts it, no longer “fruitful” [6, p.291].
It is then only a small further step to abandon such surplus vocabulary, on the
grounds of conceptual parsimony.
What could be a reason to retain these concepts? We have already seen
two motivations—the container metaphor and viewing the spacetime–matter
distinction as the most basic metaphysical dichotomy such that everything
falls into exactly one of these categories—which, if they ever were a motivation
for introducing the spacetime–matter distinction, definitely can not serve as
reasons anymore in light of SFDM. One might insist that we still need this
distinction to make sense of the (modified) Newtonian gravity and special
relativistic regimes of theories such as SFDM and GR. These concepts may well
be useful in those limits, just as the concepts of chairs, tigers and temperature
are, but that does not make these concepts fundamental, i.e. relevant for the
fundamental description of reality, just as chairs, tables and temperature are
not.
Mentioning Newtonian Gravity just now does remind us of the ‘work’ that
the concept(s) of spacetime (and matter) did in that theory: space(time) pro-
vided a distinction between inertial and non-inertial motion (of all matter).
Hence, when the (strong) geodesic criterion (§3) is included in the set of crite-
ria that allow interpreting something as spacetime, it may seem that the weak
breakdown interpretation becomes analytically false: if an object is spacetime
with respect to test particles of matter in the sense that the trajectories of
all those test particles follow the geodesics of that object (and non-test parti-
cles do not) then that concept of spacetime so instantiated automatically does
‘work’ in that it distinguishes between inertial and non-inertial motion of all
matter, and hence the concept deserves to be retained. But this is only correct
in a restricted sense. The qualifiers ‘all’ are crucial. As mentioned earlier in
this section, the prequel paper concluded that g˜SFDM satisfies the criteria for
being spacetime with respect to test particles (and rods and clocks) made out
of luminous matter, which is pure matter, i.e. fully matter but not at all space-
time. But what about test particles made out of Φ? They couple to (only) the
Einstein metric rather than to g˜SFDM and hence the geodesic criterion is not
satisfied for the combination of g˜SFDM and Φ-test-matter. And it’s exactly
the conceptually novel Φ field that we are trying to interpret. And it is not
the case that Φ, qua matter, experiences what we had identified as spacetime
(g˜SFDM ) nor is it true that Φ, qua aspect of spacetime (via g˜SFDM ), provides
a distinction between inertial and non-inertial motion for all matter. Thus,
this specific type of ‘work’, that we are used to being done by the concept(s)
of spacetime (and matter), does not extend fully to hybrid theories such as
SFDM.
Alternatively, in response to the question of what reason one may have
to retain the concepts of spacetime and matter, one might consider the idea
that (modified) spacetime and (dark) matter have different explanatory roles to
play.35 One example would be the claim that spacetime and matter stand in an
35Depending on one’s favourite model of explanation, the previous suggestion—providing a dis-
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asymmetric explanatory relation to each other. For instance, consider theories
with a dynamical metric and other fields such that if we create test particles,
light rays, rods and clocks out of these other fields, the metric satisfies the
(strong) geodesic criterion (i.e. if test particles and/or light rays were around
they would, for any choice of initial conditions, follow the timelike and null
geodesics, respectively, of this metric) and the chronogeometricity criterion
(i.e. local validity of special relativity) with respect to those other fields (see
[19]). We may then want to call the metric ‘spacetime’ and those other fields
‘matter’. On the so-called ‘dynamical approach’ to this metric, it is because
of properties of those matter fields and the way in which they are coupled
to the metric that the metric field obtains its chronogeometric meaning (and
presumably also its inertial meaning, and thereby thus full spatiotemporality)
[21]. Properties of matter fields (and the way in which they are coupled to the
metric) explain why matter—rods, clocks, test particles—surveys the metric
field (which therefore justifies calling the metric ‘spacetime’). On the opposing
approach, the ‘geometrical approach’, the arrow of explanation is reversed:
the metric is primitively spatiotemporal, in that it constrains the properties of
the other fields such that those survey the metric field (in the same sense as
before, i.e. the (strong) geodesic and chronogeometricity criteria). The metric
field thus explains those properties and thereby justifies referring to those fields
as ‘matter’.
Does this move apply to SFDM? We contend that it does not, regardless
of one’s preference for the direction of the arrow of explanation. Consider first
whether Φ might be both spacetime and matter (as indeed suggested by our two
families of criteria which were silent on any (further) explanatory asymmetry).
In other words, could it be that Φ is matter and gSFDMab (Φ) spacetime in the
specific sense of the previous paragraph? This would be guaranteed by a Φ
term in the SFDM Lagrangians analogous to the last terms in Eqs. 8 and 9,
i.e. Lmatter(g
SFDM
µν ,Φ,Φ;µ|g˜SFDM ). There is no such term. There may be an
arrow of explanation between gSFDMab (Φ) and luminous matter, but there is
no parallel arrow between gSFDMab (Φ) and dark matter (Φ). Could we then
perhaps view Φ as being only spacetime but not matter, in the explanatory
sense of the previous paragraph? Not only would this be to ignore that Φ scored
maximally on our family of matter criteria, but also, once again, that as far
as we know the MG-aspects only appear in the superfluid regime, and we do
not yet have a complete and fully satisfactory fundamental SFDM Lagrangian
available to determine whether Φ is in any sense a modification of spacetime at
the fundamental level. This specific attempt to justify a (modified) spacetime
vs. (dark) matter distintion via differing explanatory roles is of no avail.
Until now we have considered theory-internal senses of the ‘work’ that the
categories (dark) matter and (modified) spacetime might be doing. Perhaps
their usefulness arises at a more pragmatic, theory-external level: a heuris-
tic role in theory-development. We will discuss this issue—the usefulness of
the conceptual distinction between (dark) matter and (modified) spacetime at
the level of the space(s) of theories—in Subsection 7.2. However, this move
tinction between inertial and non-inertial motion—may also be an instance of this ‘alternative’
suggestion of considering the explanatory roles of spacetime (and matter).
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from a theory-internal to a theory-external usefulness of the distinction is to
declare it dispensable within SFDM considered in itself. As it stands we thus
sympathise, within the group of breakdown interpretations, with the weak
breakdown interpretation of the DM/MG distinction in the context of SFDM.
Nevertheless, one may argue that one specific feeling of unease remains on this
interpretation. Historically, theories that have been labeled as modifications
of gravity/spacetime have done very well at explaining galactic data but not
so well at explaining or even accounting for data at larger scales, and vice
versa for theories that have been labeled as dark matter. This may give the
impression that one necessarily needs something spatiotemporal to explain the
galactic data and something (dark) matter-like to explain data at larger scales.
Could it be these distinct explanatory roles that could be used to re-establish a
fundamental conceptual distinction between (modified) spacetime and (dark)
matter? This is the central question of our next project. On the other hand,
perhaps the lesson to be learnt from SFDM is that it is a crucial counterex-
ample to this historical trend, highlighting its contingency.
7 Cartography
In the prequel paper it was argued that the novel field Φ postulated by Berezhi-
ani and Khoury’s ‘superfluid dark matter theory’ not only maximally fits the
putative conceptual category of (dark) matter, but it also maximally fits—at
least in the superfluid regime—the putative conceptual category of (a mod-
ification of) spacetime. This paper has proposed a chart of nine—or ten, if
the demi interpretation is included for the sake of completeness—prima facie
possible interpretations of such Janus-faced objects and their theories, struc-
tured into three groups (Table 2). A first evaluation of those interpretations
for the specific case of the scalar field Φ featuring in SFDM has left four of
those options on the table as viable interpretations of Φ: the consubstantiality
interpretation, the two fundamentalist interpretations that take at least the
DM aspect to be fundamental, and the weak breakdown interpretation.
7.1 A chart of interpretations
If such cartography of the space(s) of theories is to present us with a description
and ultimately an understanding of the space(s) of theories, we need not a
mere list of interpretations, but a full chart that includes how they are ‘located’
relative to each other. While all these interpretations are mutually inconsistent,
some pairs are closer in spirit to each other than other pairs. This subsection
explores the subtle relations between the various interpretations.
One might think that the consubstantiality interpretation is nothing more
than a repetition of the result of the prequel paper, and that it is therefore the
basis of all the other eight interpretations (besides the demi interpretation).
The latter statement does not follow, since the incoherence and inapplicability
versions of the strong breakdown interpretation disagree with the results of
that paper. Moreover, the consubstantiality interpretation has more to it,
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Group (Sub)Name Description
T
h
eo
lo
g
ic
a
l
a
n
a
lo
g
ie
s
Consubstantiality The field Φ is both fully (dark) matter and fully (a
modification of) spacetime—both roles are on a par.
This leaves the conceptual categories of (dark) matter
and (modified) spacetime and their distinction
unaffected (i.e. coherent, applicable, objective and useful).
Demi The field Φ is partially (dark) matter and partially (a
modification of) spacetime. This leaves the conceptual
X categories of (dark) matter and (modified) spacetime
and their distinction unaffected (i.e. coherent, applicable,
objective and useful).
F
u
n
d
a
m
en
ta
li
sm
(MG+DM)-fundamentalism The field Φ is fundamentally both (dark) matter
(or: Dualism) and (a modification of) spacetime.
DM-fundamentalism The field Φ is fundamentally (dark) matter, but only
emergently (a modification of) spacetime.
MG-fundamentalism The field Φ is fundamentally (a modification of) space-
X time, but only emergently (dark) matter.
Non-fundamentalism The field Φ is merely emergently (dark) matter as well
(or: Neutral monism) as (a modification of) spacetime; fundamentally it is
X something else altogether.
B
re
a
k
d
ow
n Strong
Incoherence The field Φ reveals that there is no coherent conceptual
X distinction between (dark) matter and (modified) spacetime.
Inapplicability The field Φ reveals that the (dark) matter and (modified)
X
spacetime categories, despite being coherent, are the
wrong conceptual categories for SFDM.
Conventionalism There is a coherent conceptual distinction beween (dark)
X
matter and (modified) spacetime, but it is conventional
(i.e. not objective) which role applies to the field Φ.
Weak
There is a coherent, objective conceptual distinction
between (dark) matter and (modified) spacetime that
applies to the field Φ, but it is dispensable/useless. It is
then dispensed with, on grounds of conceptual parsimony.
Table 2: Chart of possible interpretations of (theories with) fields that do not
fall into exactly one of two putative categories, i.e. (dark) matter and (modified)
spacetime. A red X indicates that the interpretation is not a viable interpretation
of the scalar field Φ in SFDM.
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making it inconsistent with all the other interpretations. For one thing, it
insists that the DM/MG distinction is objective and useful, contra the whole
class of breakdown interpretations. How does it relate to the fundamentalist
interpretations? On the consubstantiality interpretation, the senses in which Φ
instantiates the DM and MG roles are on a par. It is thus in some sense closer to
the spirit of the egalitarian interpretations than the elitist interpretations. This
could easily be mistaken as agnosticism about the egalitarian interpretations—
as long as one of those is viable, the consubstantiality interpretation is viable.
Similarly, an agnostic version of the demi interpretation is consistent with any
of the four fundamentalist interpretations. In order for all ten interpretations to
be mutually exclusive, we focus on versions of the consubstantiality and demi
interpretations that embrace quietism about the fundamental vs. emergent
nature of the DM and MG aspects of Φ. There is then simply no fact of the
matter about the fundamentality of the DM and MG roles, just as one might
hold that it is not a meaningful question to ask whether Jesus is more, equally
or less fundamentally divine than he is human.
The decision between the consubstantiality, DM-fundamentalist and dual-
ist interpretations of SFDM thus depends on whether there is a matter of fact
about the fundamentality of each of the two roles that Φ instantiates. That
the latter two interpretations have not yet been ruled out may be seen as rul-
ing out the consubstantiality interpretation. Especiallly their agreement that
the DM role is a fundamental aspect of Φ may seem funest for the consub-
stantiality interpretation. However, it is not so much the case that both the
DM-fundamentalist and dualist interpretations are unproblematic, but rather
that the truth, if any, seems to lie in between. The MG aspect of Φ fits some
of the aspects of “emergence”, but not others. Perhaps the complete theory of
SFDM will solve this. If not, it may be that a different understanding of the
concept of emergence is needed, or that a new hybrid fundamentalist view is
required, or maybe we should take this problem to vindicate the consubstan-
tiality interpretation, although that seems in tension with the unproblematic
claim that the DM aspect is fundamental.
All this being said, there is one sense in which the consubstantiality and fun-
damentalist interpretations are closely related to each other when contrasted
with the breakdown interpretations. The former but not the latter consider the
DM/MG distinction to be coherent, applicable, objective and useful. Within
the group of breakdown interpretations, the one that is closest to the other five
is nevertheless the only one that is still viable: the weak breakdown interpre-
tation. In contrast to the other breakdown interpretations, this interpretation
does allow one to use the DM/MG distinction (non-conventionally). On this
interpretation it is allowed to ponder the question of whether each role is in-
stantiated fundamentally or emergently, but this would not be more than a
fun academic exercise. The issue is moot, it is pointless, if the distinction is
not useful.
The decision between the weak breakdown interpretation on the one hand,
and the other three remaining viable approaches on the other hand, depends on
the usefulness of the DM/MG distinction. In the discussion of the weak break-
down approach, several proposals for the use of the DM/MG and spacetime–
matter distinctions within SFDM have been argued against. The onus is thus
33
on the other interpretations to provide a proposal for the usefulness of these
distinctions within SFDM. We have hinted that distinct explanatory powers,
for instance with respect to galactic data vs data from clusters and cosmology,
may provide such a role. Without such a concrete theory-internal proposal
however, the contest between the weak breakdown interpretation on the one
hand, and the other three remaining viable approaches on the other hand,
is perhaps most interesting at the level of the space(s) of theory, as will be
discussed in the next subsection.
Note finally the connection between the inapplicability version of the break-
down interpretations and neutral monism. Both agree that the categories are
inapplicable at the fundamental level. Their difference though is that this is
where it stops for neutral monism, which still acknowledges their applicability
at the emergent level, whereas the inapplicability applies universally according
to the inapplicability breakdown interpretation. It is this difference that makes
the former compatible with the conclusion of the prequel paper, but not the
latter.
7.2 The upshots
What are the upshots of all of this? More precisely, what are the upshots of
this general chart of interpretations and what is the relevance of applying it to
SFDM specifically?
Perhaps the most important upshot is the realisation that there is a single
space of theories, rather than a space of spacetime theories and a space of
matter theories.36 This single space is not reducible to (just) those two sepa-
rate spaces. This is something that could have been realised directly from the
two families of criteria for being matter and being spacetime, respectively, but
which had not been sufficiently noticed due to the widespread focus on fields
that are (thought to be) purely matter or purely spacetime. (Which raises
the question: which other conceptual mistakes have we made by focusing only
on our favourite theories?) Interpreting SFDM has helped highlight this real-
isation, which was already noted in Section 6: the distinction between (dark)
matter and (modified) spacetime is not a strict dichotomy, i.e. the distinction
does not necessitate that all objects fall into exactly one of these categories.
Why did we introduce two independent families of criteria for spacetime and
matter respectively? If spacetime and matter are supposed to form a strict
dichotomy, would we then not expect a single criterion such that if the crite-
rion is satisfied by an object, then that object is a spacetime, and otherwise
it is matter, or vice versa?37 There is no reason to expect that an object
satisfying any of the spacetime criteria does not (or does) satisfy any of the
matter criteria, and vice versa. There is no conceptual link between the two
36Even if, for independent reasons, there would be multiple spaces of theories after all, it is still
the case that none of those is a pure space of spacetime theories or a pure space of matter theories,
nor do they reduce to one of these pure spaces.
37The case for a strict dichotomy gets even worse if we move away from necessary and sufficient
criteria for interpreting something as matter or spacetime, but instead consider these categories to
be cluster concepts [83].
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families of criteria, beyond the reference of the spacetime criteria to matter
(e.g. test particles, rods and clocks). In the space of theories, theories with
objects that fall under exactly one family of criteria may well be the exception;
the prima facie expectation should be to also encounter objects that resemble
both matter and spacetime, or neither. History has been such that two early
theories, Newtonian physics and special relativity, were exceptions in this re-
gard, rather than the norm. We should not be mislead into believing in a strict
spacetime–matter dichotomy merely because of our familiarity with these early
theories.
In other words, the urge to project pure spacetime and pure matter cate-
gories onto theories, such as for instance SFDM, and insisting that everything
falls into exactly one of these categories, is an artefact of our familiarity with
Newtonian theories and Special relativity. Had SFDM been the only theory
we had known, insisting on applying these pure categories would have seemed
as strange as someone insisting that we use Goodman’s bleen and grue [84] to
describe trees and the sky rather than blue and green—there is nothing inco-
herent about using bleen and grue, but they just are not particularly useful
concepts. If the first few theories or observations we came across had been
such that all red things were square or triangular and all blue things circular,
we might have developed terms such as ‘POLYGON’ and ‘BLUE’ for these
respective groups of objects. If there were no observations of further objects
not falling into these categories, we might have surmised that the most basic
conceptual distinction is the strict POLYGON-BLUE dichotomy. However,
once we would make further observations and/or further explore the space of
theories, we might realise that there is no reason why red things could not be
circular, and blue things squared or triangular, and that the POLYGON-BLUE
pattern in our first theory/data was an exception rather than the norm. We
would immediately realise, if we hadn’t already (and of course we could have,
simply by analysing the concepts of polygon and blue), that this distinction,
however coherent, is not particularly useful for fundamental metaphysics—it
does not track anything deep about the space of theories. In particular, we
would realise that there is a single space of theories with theories/objects that
are/contain blue squares, blue circles, red squares, red circles, partially blue
and partially red triangles, etc38—rather than all theories falling either into a
space of POLYGON theories or a space of BLUE theories.
These two companion papers contribute to the ‘cartography research programme’—
a generalisation of the research programme previously advocated by one of us
for the space of spacetime theories [85]—which aims to help us navigate the
single space of theories. Analysing individual theories and the similarities and
differences of neighbouring theories helps us to better understand the space of
theories as a whole, which in turn helps us better understand further individual
theories and pairs of theories, and also to re-evaluate familiar theories, such
as GR. The cartography research programme advocates a dynamic back-and-
forth between both levels of analysis. Here we developed a new dimension to
38One might retort that this leaves open the possibility that there is a different distinction that
is the most basic conceptual distinction, for instance one based on size vs. hue. However, it is hard
to see why that wouldn’t face the same problems as the POLYGON-BLUE dichotomy.
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the cartography of the space of theories, distinct from the focus of previous
cartographers [85, §2], namely interpretation of theories in terms of a DM/MG
distinction, as well as the broader spacetime–matter distinction. The result-
ing chart of interpretations may help understanding further theories (better),
whether they are new theories or plain old GR. Moreover, as the chart is not
claimed to be exhaustive, analysis of other theories will likely enrich the chart.
Note that the struggle between the consubstantiality interpretation and
the two remaining fundamentalist interpretations on the one hand, and the
weak breakdown interpretation on the other hand, may be most interesting
at the level of this space of theories. Within the bible, Jesus is the unique
human/god entity. It is in virtue of this rareness that it makes sense to keep
using the categories of (pure) human and (pure) god. If Janus-faced objects
such as Φ in SFDM turn out to be equally rare in the space of theories, then,
even though there is in principle still a single irreducible space of theories, in
practice it can be pulled apart into a space of spacetime theories and a space
of matter theories.39 It would then turn out, a posteriori, that there is in
practice, i.e. extensionally, an almost strict dichotomy between pure spacetime
and pure matter. Keeping this conceptual distinction would then be useful as
a basic categorisation principle. If there were many Jesusses and few or no
mere humans and mere gods, it would not be as helpful to stick to those two
categories as the most basic conceptual categories. Similarly, if the regions
of pure spacetime theories (such as, perhaps, certain Palatini approaches to
modified gravity [86]) and pure matter theories (such as, perhaps, certain ex-
amples of WIMP dark matter) in the space of theories turn out to be small, the
spacetime–matter distinction does not play as useful a role in the cartography
of that space.
All this relates to the issue of whether the spacetime–matter distinction
earns its spurs as a theory-external, heuristic tool. Given the lessons learnt
from SFDM, it seems that focusing on two separate spaces of theories has ac-
tually hindered theory development, as it has blinded us to potentially vast re-
gions in the space of theories. The case may thus be worse than the spacetime–
matter distinction having been neutral when it comes to its fruitfulness for the-
ory development: letting go of the distinction may actively help us in exploring
the space of theories. And even if there is a unique theory that describes our
world and that theory contains only elements that are pure matter or pure
spacetime, we can learn about that theory by studying how it differs from
hybrid theories.
In a similar vein, a strict adherence to a DM/MG dichotomy has not been
fruitful with regards to the collaboration between the DM community and
the MG community. The second upshot of these companion papers is that
it undermines the somewhat infamous hostility between these communities.
39Or, if, say, DM-fundamentalism is applicable to the majority of theories, one may be tempted
to conclude that, in practice, only the (dark) matter category is conceptually fundamental and
that the single space of theories is, basically, a space of matter theories. Note, however, that
it is not obvious that a difference in relative fundamentality between two roles means that the
more fundamental concept or the distinction between the two concepts is doing any ‘work’ in any
relevant sense.
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Upon realisation that a field being dark matter does not exclude it being also
an aspect of spacetime, and vice versa, it becomes clear that allowing that
the other community may be on the right track does not necessitate one’s
own community being misguided. The lack of collaboration between the com-
munities of course also depends on many other historical, social and economic
factors—e.g. differences in training, differences in funding—and (resulting) dif-
ferences in preferred guiding principles and theoretical virtues (e.g. accounts of
scientific explanation). Hence, it is implausible that removing the conceptual
incompatibility will by itself build a full bridge between the communities, but
hopefully it opens the door, if just a little bit. A stronger focus on hybrid
theories may help develop a trading zone [87, Ch.9] between the DM and MG
communities [88].
The third upshot of these companion papers—besides the move to a sin-
gle space of theories and the effects on the sociology of the DM and MG
communities—concerns their implications for one of the largest debates in the
philosophy of physics, that between substantivalism and relationalism about
spacetime. As this debate presupposes a conceptual distinction between space-
time and matter, it becomes moot for theories to which any of the breakdown
interpretations applies. On the (quietist—albeit not the agnosticist—version of
the) consubstantiality interpretation it is claimed that nothing further can be
said beyond the claim that the field under consideration is both (dark) matter
and (modified) spacetime and that these roles are on a par. This includes
quietism on the issue of relative fundamentality that the substantivalism–
relationalism debate is concerned with. Could the fundamentalist interpre-
tations save the debate? In fact, if the debate is being glossed over as being
about the relative fundamentality of spacetime and matter, it may even seem
that the fundamentalist interpretations just are different positions within that
debate: DM-fundamentalism is relationalism, MG-fundamentalism is monis-
tic substantivalism (also known as supersubstantivalism, dualism is (dualistic)
substantivalism, and neutral monism is either so-called ‘emergent spacetime &
matter’ or so-called ‘super-emergent spacetime’ [89].
However, if a single object is both spacetime and matter, it cannot be
that, qua substance(s), this object is relatively fundamental or emergent to it-
self, as relative fundamentality is an irreflexive relation. Moreover, the debate
concerns the relata of spatiotemporal relations: are they spacetime points or
matter? DM-fundamentalism, for instance, is perfectly compatible with the
view that a field such as Φ is a matter field that is both ‘living on’ the funda-
mental spacetime points of an underlying manifold and instantiating, in some
emergent regime, the role of a modification of the structure of that manifold.
This does not seem to resemble relationalism. Finally, an important difference
in consequence that traditionally distinguishes substantivalism from relation-
alism is that the former position considers vacuum solutions to be physically
possible whereas the latter typically (but not always) judges them to be im-
possible. However, it is not even clear whether one can ask whether vacuum
solutions are possible in theories with hybrid objects, since it is not clear in the
first place what vacuum solutions are supposed to be in such theories. If one
obtains a vacuum solution by removing all matter and including all spacetime
structure, then Φ would have to be both included and excluded to obtain a
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vacuum solution of SFDM. A detailed evaluation of (the feasibillity of) the
substantivalism–relationalism debate in the context of hybrid theories such as
SFDM goes beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that in the worst
case scenario the debate becomes ill-defined and in the best case scenario it be-
comes even more complex than it had already become in the context of modern
physics.
Finally one may ask why these companion papers focused on SFDM and not
on, say, GR? Does GR not stand a better chance at being empirically adequate?
Should we not focus all our effort on interpreting GR? Several responses are
appropriate here. First of all, suggesting that there are no empirical results
speaking against GR is to beg the question against pure MG approaches, which
claim that the empirical discrepancies that GR-advocates try to account for
with DM actually show the empirical inadequacy of GR. That being said,
SFDM is not a pure MG approach and we expect it to coincide with GR at
T ≫ Tc (see the end of Section 2). Hence, analysing SFDM does not mean that
one is not also analysing aspects of GR. More generally, one can often learn
more about theories, even familiar ones such as GR, by asking interpretative
questions about other, neighbouring theories and comparing and contrasting
the answers with the answers known from the familiar theories; at the very
least it teaches us what is special about our mainstream theories and what is
not. Finally, having a single theory, such as SFDM, that doesn’t fit a strict
DM/MG dichotomy, suffices to claim that there is a single space of theories that
is irreducible to a space of spacetime theories and a space of matter theories—
whether that theory is ultimately the correct description of our world does
not change that. We have simply chosen SFDM because Φ, being massive, is
more clearly and less controversially a hybrid object than the metric in GR is
(see e.g. Section 4 and [19, §5.1]). SFDM worsens the cracks in the spacetime–
matter dichotomy that have already arisen from GR [19, §2.2 & 5.2]. SFDM
further teaches us that the categorisation of objects can vary across theories
in the space of theories—compare the Einstein metric in GR to the Einstein
metric in SFDM—and even within single solutions: Φ satisfies the spacetime
criteria in the superfluid regime only.
None of these reasons for considering SFDM is to say that we could not have
chosen other theories to focus on. One simply has to start somewhere. Next
steps in the cartography research programme could be to ask similar interpre-
tational questions in different contexts, such as spin-2 gravity, Newton-Cartan
theory, f(R) gravity and Jordan-Brans-Dicke theories, other hybrid DM/MG
theories,40 the cosmological constant, black holes, unified field theories, su-
persymmetric theories, and theories of quantum gravity41. Within the car-
tography research programme, progress requires a continuous back and forth
between analysis of individual theories and analysis of the space of theories.
Another interesting follow-up would be to determine which modifications of
SFDM would make Φ more or less of a dark matter field, and more or less of
40Read et al. seem to suggest that TeVeS itself may be a hybrid theory [90]. For potential
further, interesting case studies, see [91–102].
41A particularly interesting example could be the dilaton in string theory. We would like to
thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
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a modification of spacetime.42 Extending the current context and analysing
other contexts are however work for another day. We hope to have provided
some useful tools—possible interpretations and arguments in favour of and
against various versions of these interpretations—in exploring this map.
8 Conclusion
There is a single space of theories, which is not reducible to (just) a space
of spacetime theories and another space of matter theories. This conclusion
was reached via Superfluid Dark Matter Theory, which has helped highlight
an important feature of the families of criteria for being matter and for being
spacetime (which were reported in the prequel paper): they do not not form
a strict dichotomy, but allow objects to satisfy criteria of either one family,
of both, or of neither. The ‘cartography research programme’ aims to anal-
yse individual theories or pairs of theories in the space of theories in order
to better understand the space of theories as a whole, which in turn helps
us understand further individual theories and pairs of theories. This paper
has provided a (non-exhaustive) chart of nine interpretations—structured into
three groups—that may help navigate the space of theories. The chart was
illustrated by applying it to the novel scalar field Φ within SFDM, which was
concluded in the prequel paper to be as much (dark) matter as it could possi-
bly be, and—at least in the superfluid regime—as much (of a modification of)
spacetime as it could possibly be. Five of the nine interpretations have been
ruled out for Φ; at least one interpretation within each of the three groups re-
mains on the table: the consubstantiality interpretation, DM-fundamentalism,
(MG+DM)-fundamentalism (also known as dualism), and the weak break-
down interpretation. Although it is expected that finding a complete theory
of SFDM may further narrow down the interpretational options, the arena
where the ultimate fate of the DM/MG distinction and the broader matter–
spacetime distinction, i.e. of our Democritean-Newtonian goggles, will be de-
cided is likely the space of theories. We hope to have provided some useful
cartographic tools—possible interpretations of Janus-faced theories and argu-
ments in favour of and against these interpretations—towards this endeavour.
Everyone is cordially invited to contribute to the cartography research pro-
gramme. Physicists from the DM and MG communities are encouraged to
consider focusing on a single space of theories as an overarching framework,
and to use hybrid theories as a bridge across the gap between the communities.
42For instance, a very recent modification of SFDM by Berezhiani, Famaey & Khoury [30] couples
photons not to g˜µν but to gµν . Prima facie, this undermines our claim that Φ is a modification
of spacetime [19, section 5.2], and may seem to release the pressure on the matter–spacetime
distinction by rendering Φ a pure matter field. On second thought, it may indicate either a)
that there are several spacetimes—one experienced by photons, the other by the other luminous
matter—or b) that both gµν and g˜µν are structural aspects of a single underlying spacetime; or c)
that there is no spacetime at all in SFDM (which prompts the question of how to categorise gµν
and g˜µν); or d) that the strong geodesic criterion should be weakened to exclude light rays, i.e. it
should be replaced by what we call the weak geodesic criterion [19, section 3.2]. Neither option
paints a simple picture of the spacetime–matter distinction. See also [101,103].
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Philosophers of physics are encouraged to consider the interpretational ques-
tions voiced in these companion papers in different contexts, i.e. for different
points and pairs of (neighbouring) points in the space of theories, to consider
the feasibility of the substantivalism–relationalism debate when it comes to
hybrid theories, and to enrich the interpretational chart; in other words, to
colour in the rough sketch of a map provided here.
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